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PREFACE
The primary purpose of this work is to enunciate and defend the view
that abstract structure is the proper subject matter of mathematics. As
I describe it, this view is Platonistic. Yet it is incompatible v^ith
traditional mathematical Platonism, since it denies the existence of
special mathematical objects.
Certain branches of mathematics do seem to require special objects.
Arithmetic seems to require natural numbers; analysis, real numbers; set
theory, pure sets.* But in my first chapter, I argue in favor of a
reinterpretation of the special branches, arithmetic and analysis.
Arithmetic is not concerned v/ith special objects, natural numbers, but
rather v;ith all number-like sequences. Analysis is not concerned v/ith
special objects, real numbers, but v/ith all real-number-llke systems.
I also argue for an expansion of the background theory, set theory, so
that it is not concerned specially with pure sets, but v/ith all sets,
pure and impure. From my arguments I conclude that the appsirent need for
special mathematical objects is not genuine.
If there are no mathematical objects, what then is mathematics
about? My answer is that mathematics is a very general study of more or
less ordinary things. Among "more or less ordinciry things", I include
functions, relations, and systems of functions and relations. These
entities may be quite theoretical, such as the continuum of spatio-
*A pure set is one founded solely on the empty set. All its members,
all members of its members, all members of members of its members, etc.,
are sets.
iv
temporal distance relations (a real-number-like system)
,
or mundane, such
as the ways of rotating an automobile tire (a group of rotations). They
are not "ordinary" in the sense of being concrete things, but primarily
in the sense that they are not specially mathematical entities— they are
objects for empirical sciences.
My second chapter begins v;ith a certain picture of mathematics:
Mathematics divides into a number of mathematical theories . Each mathe-
matical theory is concerned v;ith all systems of a certain sort. Thus
group theory is concerned with all groups, and arithmetic is concerned
with all number-like sequences. Particular systems are provided by the
empirical sciences, and they may be construed as ordered n- tuples of
objects, functions, relations, and sets. Each theory has its own postu-
lates
,
postulates telling us which systems are the concern of the theory.
These postulates contain only notions of higher-order logic and set theo-
ry, Finally, the special notions of a mathematical theory are all the
notions which are preserved under isomorphisms of the relevant sj»stems.
This picture incorporates some of the ideas of category theory , and it
may serve as a bridge to a more sophisticated view.
From this picture we can see that mathematics is not concerned with
all aspects of ordinary things, but only v/ith their abstr ,a_c_t structura
l
aspects. Abstract structure is structure generated by the notions
of
higher-order logic and set theory: the notion of an object possessing a
property, the notion of two objects bearing a relation, the notion
of one
object being the result of applying a function to another object,
and the
notion of an object being a member of a set. In my second
chapter, I
V
give a precise fornulation of the view that mathematics is about abstract
structure. I also point out strong affinities betv/een this view, struc -
turalism
. and an older view, logicism .
In my final chapter, I discuss set theoretic foundations for struc-
turalist mathematics. Highlights include a rejection of the Axiom of
Infinity, defense of a Platonistic conception of sets, and a proposal
that sets are identical with certain properties.
In developing structuralism, I have attempted to keep ontology and
ideology at a minimum. I state principles in modal form only where the
corresponding nonmodal principles are too weak to be interesting. The
main structuralist doctrines are stated v/ithout modalities. Objects
v/hich would outstrip the ranks of set theory, the types of type theory,
have been studiously avoided. For example, I postulate no membership
relation, since it would be borne by sets of arbitrarily high rank, and
no exemplification relation, since it would be borne by objects and
properties of arbitrarily high type. Similarly, I have not postiuated
’’abstract structural properties”, such as the property an operation has
just in case it is a group, and the property a relation has just in case
it is a number-like sequence, an 6J-sequence . These too would be in-
stanced by objects of arbitrarily high type.
Although I postulate no relations of membership and exemplification
and no structural properties, I do speak of the notions of
membership and
exemplification and of structural notions . These notions are
relation-
like, or property-like things. For example, just as v,e may say
that two
objects bear a relation, we may say that an object and a set
"bear" or
Vi
"satisfy" the nembership notion. And just as wo may say that an object
exemplifies a certain property, so v^e may say that a function "has" or
"satisfies" the group notion.
I shall have much to say about notions, but i do not v/ish to commit
myself on the question of what exactly they are. There are at least four
interesting theories:
N1 Notions are Platonic universals which outstrip all types or ranlcs.
N2 Notions are ways of thinking about things. (For instance, the




N3 Notions are symbols. (For Instance, the notion of an <u-sequence
is just the predicate "is an w-sequence"
.
)
N4 Notions are symbolic constructions. (That is, they are nothing
at all: Talk of notions is disguised talk about symbols.)
None of these theories strikes me as especially unreasonable. Each the-
ory explains how notions can be relation-like. According to N1
,
notions
can just be "super-relations". According to N2, a notion can "relate"
objects in the sense of being a true way of thinliing about them. Accor-
ding to N3, a notion can "relate" objects in the sense of being a true
predicate of them. N/f has not been spelled out, but I think that it too
would yield a sense in which notions can "relate" things.
Besides relation-like notions, there are also function-like notions,
notions which, like functions, "map" objects to other objects. The above
theories can easily be extended to cover these notions as well.
In view of my acceptance of the classical, Platonistic conception of
set (indeed, of sets, properties, relations, and functions), it may seem
strange that I shy away from the super-Platonism of N1 . My attitude here
vii
is the result of considerable reflection. Within the ranks and tynes, I
have found no acceptable alternative to the Platonistic conception. On
the other hand, there is no mathematical need for a rich Platonistic
totality of notions. What I call notions might be confined to inscribed
symbols or acts of human thought.
I intend that my writing will serve as an introduction to the modern
problems of mathematical ontology, problems which can be grasped only by
those who see that structuralism is at least a correct view of large
portions of mathematics. In order to achieve this purpose, I stick close
by all orthodox postions, except where I find them indefensible, and I
avoid discussing some of the complexities of opposing viev/s. I think the
result is accessible to anyone acquainted with the essentials of higher-
order logic and set theory.
The problems of mathematical ontology are of very general philo-
sophical significance and must prove fascinating to anyone possessed of
genuine curiosity. On this I base my hope that the rewards of reading
this piece outweigh the difficulties.
I am very much indebted to Michael Jubien, both for his extensive
criticisms and for many of the ideas that inspired this work. I also
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The primary purpose of this v/ork is to enunciate and defend the viev;
that abstract structure is the proper subject matter of mathematics. As
I describe it, this view is Platonistic. Yet it is incompatible with
traditional mathematical Platonism, since it denies the existence of
special mathematical objects.
Certain branches of mathematics do seem to require special objects.
Arithmetic seems to require natural numbers; analysis, real numbers; set
theory, pure sets.* But in my first chapter, I argue in favor of a
reinterpretation of the special branches, aritliraetic and analysis.
Arithmetic is not concerned with special objects, natural numbers, but
rather with all number-like-sequences. Analysis is not concerned with
special objects, real numbers, but v/ith all real-number-like systems.
I also argue for an expansion of the background theory, set theory, so
*A pure set is one founded solely on the empty set. All its members,
all members of its members, all members of members of its members, etc.,
are sets.
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that it is not concerned specially with pure sets, but with a3J. sets,
pure and impure. From my arguments I conclude that the apparent need for
special mathematical objects is not genuine.
If there are no mathematical objects, what then is mathematics
about? Hy answer is that mathematics is a very general study of more or
less ordinary things. Among "more or less ordinary things", I include
functions, relations, and systems of functions and relations. These
entities na^* be quite theoretical, such as the continuum of spatio-
temporal distance relations (a real-nuraber-like system), or mundane, such
as the ways of rotating an automobile tire (a group of rotations). They
are not "ordinary" in the sense of being concrete things, but primarily
in the sense that they are not specially mathematical entities— they are
objects for empirical sciences.
My second chapter begins with a certain picture of mathematics:
Mathematics divides into a number of mathematical theories . Each mathe-
matical theory is concerned v/ith all systems of a certain sort. Thus
group theory is concerned with all groups, and arithmetic is concerned
with all number-like sequences. Particular systems are provided by the
empirical sciences, and they may be construed as ordered n-tuples of
objects, functions, relations, and sets. Each theory has its own postu-
lates
,
postulates tolling us which systems are the concern of the theory.
These postulates contain only notions of higher-order logic and set theo-
ry. Finally, the special notions of a mathematical theory are all the
notions which are preserved under isomorphisms of the relevant systems.
--This picture incorporates some of the ideas of category theory, and it
X
may serve as a bridge to a more sophisticated view.
From this picture we can see that mathematics is not concerned with
all aspects of ordinary things, but only with their abstract s true tural
aspects. Abstract structure is structure generated by the notions of
higher-order logic and set theory: The notion of an object possessing a
property, the notion of two objects bearing a relation, the notion of one
object being the result of applying a function to another object, and the
notion of an object being a member of a set. In my second chapter, I
give a precise formulation of the view that mathematics is about abstract
structure. I also point out strong affinities between this view, struc -
turalism
,
and an older viev/, logicism .
In my final chapter, I discuss set theoretic foundations for struc-
turalist mathematics. Highlights include a rejection of the Axiom of
Infinity, defense of a Platonistic conception of sets, and a proposal
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MATHEMATICS WITHOUT MATHEMATICAL OBJECTS
1 . Arithmetic Without Numbers
Statements of arithmetic contadn constants, "0", "1", "2", *'3", and
so on, and quantifiers restricted by the word "number". It is easy to




and that the quantifiers are restricted to a definite kind— the numbers.
However, there is a serious objection to this supposition: Although it
is generally agreed that numbers must be abstract objects, there has
been no fully successful attempt to identify which abstract objects the
numbers are.
The problem is not that we lack theories of number. V/e have the
theory that numbers are pure sets, 0, ^0}, [0, l0}j, and so on, the theo-
ry that numbers are properties of sets, the property of having no mem-
bers, the property of having one member, the property of having two mem-
bers, and so on, the theory that numbers are just numerical symbol-types,
"0", "1", "2", and so on, as well as many others. The problem is that we
have no good reason to think that any particular one of these theories is
correct.*
Arithmetic itself provides incomplete clues. To be sure, numbers
are supposed to form an infinite sequence, and there are supposed to
be
certain operations among numbers, operations having certain formal
pro-
*Paul Benacerraf pointed out the difficulty in his article What
Numbers Could Not Be".
1
2perties. However, these characteristics are insufficient to single the
numbers out. If there are any number-like sequences, there are many such
sequences. On each such sequence, there are operations with the formal
properties arithmetic operations are supposed to have.
It is the function of number terms in nonmathematical discourse that
provides the basis for many theories of number.* Yet this basis is a
very shaky one. On the one hand, number terms appear to function ambigu-
ously in ordinary discourse. The most pronounced ambiguity is that be-
cardinalities and integral proportions
. (See section 2 of this
chapter.) On the other hand, it is far from clear that number terms must
denote the very same things in both ordinary and mathematical contexts.
So even if we arrive at a theory of what "numbers”, in ordinary dis-
course, are, we may not have a good theory of the objects of arithmetic.
At this point, a defender of numbers might object: Why suppose that
there is a problem of "identifying" numbers? Numbers might be abstract
objects of a unique sort
,
and so not admit of any independent specifica-
tion.
The trouble with this proposal is that it leaves us with no idea of
how we are acquainted with abstract objects of the unique sort.** For
typical abstract objects, acquaintance is relatively straightforward. It
proceeds by means of abstraction
,
the recognition of common features and
*The most notable example is the account of number contained in
Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic .
**In "Ontology and Mathematical Truth", Michael Jubien points out
the related problem of referring to numbers. However, Jubien thinks
that there is a generail problem of reference to abstract entities,
whereas my arguments concerning acquaintance are directed solely at
special mathematical entities.
3relations, and is founded ultimately on the experience of particulars .
By the usual means of acquaintance, we come to know such things as
properties, relations, functions, and sets. Unfortunately, we have found
ourselves unable to identify numbers with any of these. If we now erect
a separate ontological category for numbers, we are left with the very
serious difficulty of saying how we are acquainted with them.
I conclude that since we lack sufficient means for identifying
numbers as particular abstract objects, the hypothesis that arithmetic
constants denote definite objects, numbers, is very doubtful. Never-
theless, arithmetic statements are meaningful. Some are true; others,
false. If they are not statements about numbers, how are they to be
interpreted?
My answer is that they may be interpreted as disguised generaliza-
tions concerning all number-like sequences. I claim two advantages for
this interpretation. First, due to the facte just mentioned, it is far
more natural than any interpretation according to which arithmetic is
concerned with a particular infinite sequence. Second, it shows how we
can pursue arithmetic without committing ourselves to the existence of
particular objects, numbers. Thus we may avoid one great stumbling block
in the foundations of mathematics, the apparent need to postulate the
existence of infinite totalities.
Such an interpretation has been outlined before in Nicholas White's
article, "What Numbers Are". However, an exact assessment is impossible
unless we work out the rather intricate details. As a reward for our
labors, we shall uncover features of arithmetic which can be generalized
to all typical branches of mathematics.
4A number-like sequence, or oj-sequence
. is a relation R satisfying
the following postulates:
Alw Nothing bears the relation R to more than one thing.
A2.Ci No two things bear the relation R to the same thing.
A3oJ Everything in the field of R bears R to something.*
A4oJ There is a unique object 0 in the field of R such that nothing
bears the relation R to it.
A30) For any set x of objects from the field of R, if 0 is in x, and
for any objects a and b, if a is in x and a bears R to b, then
b is in jt, then every object in the field of R is in x.
These are Dedekind-Peano postulates for "the relation of arithmetic suc-
cession", "the relation a number n bears to the number n + 1", except
that I am not giving a definite interpretation for the variable "R" .
In the interpretation of arithmetic I am proposing, each arithmetic
constant denotes a function-like entity which maps any a>-sequence to an
object in its field. For example, "0" denotes that function-like entity
which maps each <o-sequence R to its first member, that is, to that object
in the field of R such that nothing bears R to it.
I say "function-like entities" because these things are not true
functions. They transcend all the types of type theory, all the ranks
of set theory. This is so because they can map t>-sequences to objects at
arbitrarily high types or ranks.** I take it that all true functions be-
long to some type or rank. Hence these entities are not true
functions.
•The field of a relation R is the set of all objects a such that
either a bears R to some object b, or some object b bears R to a.
**If there are any co-sequences, then there are co-sequences
of arbi-
trarily high type or rank; Suppose there is an co-sequence
R with members
a, a', a”,... Let X be an object of arbitrarily high type^or
rank.
Then clearly* there is an co-sequence R‘ with members
X, a, a', a",...
The type or rank of R' is yet higher than that of
X.
5I shall call such function-like nonfunctions functional notions
. Simi-
larly, there are relation-like nonrelations which I shall call relational
notions
. These include, for example, the notion of set raerabersnip. I
shall call unary relational notions property-notions
. The notion of an
^-sequence is a property-notion.
Each n-ary arithmetic operation symbol denotes a functional notion
which maps each £u-sequence to an n-ary operation on the field of tnat
sequence. Thus denotes a functional notion which yields a binary
operation whenever it is applied to an u)-sequence.
Each n-ary arithmetic predicate denotes a functional notion which
maps each h)-sequence to an n-ary relation on the field of that sequence.
Thus "is divisible by" denotes a functional notion which yields a binary
relation whenever it is applied to an d)-sequence.
The statement "2 + 3 = 5" is a truth of arithmetic because for any
d)-sequence R, the value at R of the functional notion denoted by "+" is
a binary operation which when applied to the value at R of the functional
notion denoted by "2" and the value at R of the functional notion denoted
t>y "3" yields a result which is identical to the value at R of the func-
tional notion denoted by "5". —This example illustrates the proposed
interpretation. In the truth conditions for a statement of arithmetic,
reference is made to all CJ-sequences
.
We can give a general semantics along these lines. Let us define an
assignment to be a function f which maps arithmetic constants, variables,
primitives, and complex terms to functional notions, and which meets the
following conditions:
(0 For any arithmetic constant /<, f^^ (meaning: f(K)) is the functional
6notion k denotes. maps each w-sequence to an item in its field.
(2) For any primitive n-ary operation symbol t", f^n is the functional
notion which r denotes, f^n maps each w-sequence to an n-ary
operation on the field of R.
(5)
For any primitive n-ary predicate f^n is the functional notion
which 7f^ denotes, f^n maps each co-sequence R to an n-ary relation
on the field of R.
(4) For any arithmetic variable
,
f;^^ is some functional notion which
maps each w-sequence to an item in its field.







is assigned a functional notion
V such that for every w-sequence R,f V , . * •
,
= f^n.(R)(f .(R),..., f .(R)) *
I n 1 n
Notice that by (1), (2), and (3)» each assignment is an extension of the
natural denotation function for arithmetic primitives. Satisfac tion is
defined relative to a given w-sequence R:
(6) An assignment f satisfies an identity formula T = d in R if and
only if f^.(R) = f^.(R)
(7) An assignment f satisfies an atomic formula , . . .
,
in R
if and only if f .(R),..., f . (R) bear the relation Cn.(R)
^1 ^n
(8) An assignment f satisfies a wff in R if and only if it does
not satisfy 9 in R.
(9) An assignment f satisfies a wff in R if and only if it
satisfies both 9 and 9 in R.
(10) An assignment f satisfies a wff in R if and only if there
is an assignment which differs from f, in regard to variables, at
most in the case of and which satisfies f in R.
Defining truth is a two-stage process:
*I use the dot to distinguish applications of functional and
relational notions from applications of functions and relations. Thus
"n.(R)(a, b)" denotes the result of applying the function n.(R) to a and
b, where n.(R) is the result of applying the functional notion n to
R.
7(TO) A wff 9 is true of an w-sequence R if and only if every assignment
satisfies 9 in R.
(T) A wff 9 is true if and only if it is true of every co-sequence.
The most natural definition of falsehood is:
(F) A wff T is false if and only if its negation is true.
Nothing in these rules precludes the possibility of truth-value
gaps. There are notions which are true of some, but not all, co-sequen-
ces. By (T) and (F), if any such notion corresponds to an arithmetic
statement, then that statement is neither true nor false. But it seems
clear that every statement of arithmetic is either true or false. Hence
there should be some restriction on the interpretation which insures that
this is so. What sort of restriction will do?
The constant ”0” is most naturally assigned a functional notion
which picks out the first member of any co-sequence. Suppose we introduce
a constant ”0*". Suppose we let it denote a functional notion which maps
an co-sequence R to its first member if R is not identical to a certain
co-sequence R*
,
and which maps R* itself to its second member. If this is
permissible, then the formula ”0 = 0*” is neither true nor false. I am
assuming, on the contrary, that there are no truth-value gaps. There is
something wrong with the interpretation of "0*", No constant so inter-
preted can belong to the language of airithmetic.
Similsirly, unacceptable interpretations can be concocted for predi-
cates and operation symbols.
Note that the functional notion assigned to "0" maps an w-sequence
R to something definable in terms of R, namely that item in the field of
R such that nothing bears R to it. Note also that for every w-sequence
8R, the definition retains its form. This is not the case with the func-
I
tional notion denoted by "0*". Thus we might look for a definability
restriction on our arithmetic interpretation. Unfortunately, there may
be no general notion of definability which would solve our problems with
predicates and operation symbols.
Roughly speaking, a notion is an acceptable interpretation of an
arithmetic constant or primitive just in case it maps the various co-se-
I
!
quences to things which exhibit a constant structural role in their
respective a)-sequences. So, for instance, constants denote functional
notions which map w-sequences to n-th members of those sequences, for
^
some fixed n. Maintaining a fixed structural role from w-sequence to
I a)-sequence is more complicated in the case of the notions denoted by
predicates and operation symbols. To circumscribe acceptable inter-
pretations in a general way, we need to make use of the notion of an
: isomorphism
,
a structure-preserving mapping or function,
j
Isomorphisms of relations may be defined as follows:
' D1 i is an isomorphism of relations from R to R' =df (1) i is a
I one-to-one function, (2) the domain of i is the field of R,
(3) the range of i is the field of R' , and (4) for any objects
a and b in the domain of i,
Rfa, b] iff R'fi(a), i(b)] *
Two relations are said to be isomorphic if there is an isomorphism from
i
\ one to the other. It is a fact that all ^-sequences are isomorphic to
I
one another, and that any relation which is isomorphic to an ^-sequence
1 is itself an cj-sequence.
i
I
I *The basic terms for describing functions, "domain", "range",
' one-
! to-one", and so on, are precisely defined in section 4 of chapter
II.
9Arithmetic notions may be defined as notions which are preserved, in
a certain sense, under all w-sequence isomorphisms. They come in various
kinds, corresponding to the different types of arithmetic symbols. Con-
stants of arithmetic denote ob.iect notions of art thm^ti r. r
f is an object notion of arithmetic =df f is a functional no-
tion which maps each a>-sequence to an item in its field, and
for any isomorphism i from an ^b-sequence R to an w-sequence R',
i(f.(R)) = f.(R')
Primitive arithmetic operation symbols denote operation notions of arith-
metic ;
D3o) f is an n-ary operation notion of arithmetic =df f is a func-
tional notion which maps each ^J-sequence to an n-ary operation
on the field of that sequence, and for any isomorphism i from
an ^>)-sequence R to an CJ-sequence R', and any objects a a
a in the dom2iin of i, In
n+
1
f.(R)(a^,..., a^) = a^^^ iff f
.
(R' ) (i(a^ ),..., i(a^) )= i(a^^^
)
Primitive arithmetic predicates denote relation notions of arithmetic :
f is an n-ary relation notion of arithmetic =df f is a func-
tional notion which maps each w-sequence to an n-ary relation
on the field of that sequence, and for any isomorphism i from
an w-sequence R to an <*)-sequence R', and any objects a^,..., a^
in the domain of i,
f.(R)Ca^,..., a^] iff f . (R* ) [i(a^ ) , . . .
,
i(a^)J
Only arithmetic notions should be assigned to arithmetic constants and
primitives. This constitutes our final rule of interpretation:
(11) An assignment to an arithmetic constant or primitive must be
an arithmetic notion.
It can be shown that this restriction yields the desired result. It
follows from the complete semantics that every statement of arithmetic is
either true or false. It follows because of a fact about hj-sequences,
namely that they are all isomorphic to one another.
10
Under the proposed semantics, all the laws of arithmetic are neces-
sarily true. It is easy to convince ourselves of this: (l) Suppose
there is an (J-sequence of objects, putative numbers. Then a theorem of
i
arithmetic f is true when interpreted in terms of those objects. But
there is obviously a corresponding general truth about all lij-sequences.
j
According to the proposed semantics, 9 expresses this general truth.
I
(2) Suppose, on the other hand, that there is no (o-sequence of objects,
I
nothing to serve as the numbers. Then the proposed semantics tells us
j




This way of interpreting arithmetic has some significant advantages.
1
I
First, it is an especially natural interpretation. On the one hand,
I
arithmetic has aill the appearance of an uninterpreted system, a system
advitting various applications. On the other hand, arithmetic statements
i
j
have definite truth-values, so cannot be entirely uninterpreted. The
i
j
proposed semantics explaiins these facts. Arithmetic appears to be un-
interpreted because while seeming to be a theory about particular ob-
i
jocts, it is not really one. Instead it is a theory we can apply to any
I h)-sequence we encounter, nevertheless, arithmetic statements have defi-
!
nite truth-values . Each corresponds to a generalization concerning all
i O-sequences
,
a generalization which is definitely true or false. Appli-
( cation of an arithmetic statement is straightforward. We simply con-
j
!
sider that instance of the corresponding generalization which involves
I
*So too are their negations, in apparent violation of the law
of
noncontradiction. Later in this section, I shall explain why I find
this
result harmless.
the Ci)-sequence with which we are concerned.
Standard interpretations assign objects to arithmetic constants,
operations on those objects to operation symbols, and relations on those
objects to arithmetic predicates. There are many standcird interpreta-
tions which promise to yield the correct distribution of truth-values
over arithmetic statements. However, each suffers from unnaturalness.
Each standau?d interpretation suggests a resolution of the irresol-
vable, our basic confusion over what numbers are. Each obscures the most
fascinating fact in the whole subject, the fact that despite our confu-
sion, we are able to employ arithmetic language with great precision.
The proposed semantics has another, more palpable advantage. If
airithmetic is interpreted in terms of objects, then acceptance of arith-
metic statements involves commitments to the existence of those objects.
Under the interpretation I have presented, arithmetic can be pursued
without such commitments. This is but the first of several results
supporting the conclusion thatthe theorems of classical mathematics do
not entail the existence of anything.
Let us pause to consider some objectsions to this nonstandard
interpretation:
Objection 1 : A sentence is true just in case what it says is true. The
given semantics violates this tenet. It says that an arithmetic sentence
is true just in case what it says is true of every co-sequence. Hence
this theory of arithmetic truth is not a theory of truth at all.
Reply : There is no good reason to think that truth of arithmetic sen-
tences is just a special case of the truth of ordinary sentences. Arith-
metic sentences au'e quite extraordinary. There is no obvious
way to
12
interpret them. Arithmetic constants do not stand for definite objects,
numbers. Operation symbols of arithmetic do not stand for operations on
such definite objects. Arithmetic predicates do not stand for relations
among numbers. Among the alternative standard interpretations, no one
is especially attractive. Too many are equally attractive. Hence any
natural interpretation of arithmetic, like that given above, :aust be of
a new sort.
Objection 2 : You say that arithmetic constants aire not to be interpreted
by definite objects which are the numbers. But the above semantics does
assign objects to arithmetic constants, namely functional notions of a
certain sort. Why aren't they the numbers?
Reply : We should not consider the assignments to constants in isolation.
Pairt of what is meant when it is said that numerals stand for numbers is
that they play a certain role in arithmetic discourse. In that role,
they are supposed to denote arguments of operations and relations, opera-
tions denoted by arithmetic symbols such as relations denoted by
predicates such as "is divisible by". In the proposed semantics, opera-
tion symbols do not denote operations on the object assigned to arith-
metic constants. They do not denote operations at all. They denote
functional notions which are not operations. Similarly, arithmetic pred-
icates do not denote relations of the things denoted by arithmetic con-
stants. Hence, on the new semantics, eirithmetic constants do not play
the fanciful role of "names of numbers".
Objection 3 : Doesn’t the new semantics commit us to the existence of
things stranger than numbers, neimely functional and relational notions?
Reply : I have not said what notions are. Perhaps they are very familiar
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things. The semantics requires a notion corresponding to each inscribed
constant or primitive of arithmetic. It is possible to maintain that
these notions are constituted by the inscriptions themselves! Surely we
believe in the existence of the inscriptions. We have seen them.
It is slightly more difficult to describe things which nay be
assigned to variables. For any io-sequence R, we want at least as many
assignable objects as there are items in the field of R. Our require-
ments are satisfied if for every w-sequence R and object x in the field
of R, there is a notion which maps each to-sequence to its own "x-th"
member. Such a notion may be construed as an ordered pair, (R, x) . We
specify that:
(R, x).(R') = i(x), where i is any Isomorphism from the
d)-sequence R to the w-sequence R*
In this way, assignments to variables may be reduced to "logical con-
structions" on sequences and objects.
Objection 4 ? The proposed semantics gives a preposterous account of
simple arithmetic statements, such as "2 + 3 = 5" • Surely these state-
ments are not generalizations about infinite sequences, not even dis-
guised ones.
Reply : This objection is a good one. The new semantics is only suited
to statements which appear to involve the whole infinity of numbers, only
to quantified arithmetic statements. Is there a way to modify it?
Notions of infinite arithmetic have a "partial extension" to finite
sequences.* For example, instead of interpreting "5" with the notion of
*A sequence may be defined as a relation which satisfies postulates
A]ui, A2(b, A4cj, and A finite sequence is a sequence which does not
satisfy A36>.
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a sixth member of an o-sequence, we may let it denote the notion of the
sixth term of any sequence. That latter notion is defined over many
finite sequences. Similarly, "+•' can be so interpreted that it yields
partial operations on finite sequences. Under such an extended inter-
pretation, ”2 + 3 = 5*’ is not only true of all (^-sequences, but also of
all finite sequences over which its component notions are defined. Thus
we might give different truth-conditions for such finite statements:
(TU) An unquantified arithmetic sentence T is true if and only if
it is true of every sequence over which its component notions
are defined.
We avoid the objection by saying that unquantified arithmetic statements
are more generaLL than originally supposed. If true, they must be true of
all sufficiently long sequences.*
Objection 3 : By interpreting arithmetic in the suggested way, we are
supposed to avoid commitments to the infinity of numbers. However,
notice that very strange things happen if there are no ^o-sequences. On
the proposed interpretation, if there are no 6)-sequences, both the sen-
tence "There are infinitely many primes" and the sentence "There are not
infinitely many primes" are true. Thus the new semantics allows viola-
tions of the law of noncontradiction. This can be avoided only at the
price of tacking the existence of an (jO-sequence onto the truth-condi-
tions. But then arithmetic is not ontologically neutral, and its theo-
rems are not obviously true.
•Even the modified semantics has some unintuitive results. If there
are no w-sequences, then, under the modified semantics, the quantified
sentence "Every number is even" is true. Yet it seems to be falsified
on finite sequences. A further modification of the semantics is neces-
sary to take such quantified sentences into account.
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This observation, properly understood, is correct. However,
other observations suggest that the result is harmless. First, it is
clear that this possibility of arithmetic contradiction is not the possi-
bility of a genuine contradiction. We may not infer what we please from
such a contradiction. Second, if we follow the suggestion in the pre-
ceding reply, the problem will not affect all of finite arithmetic. If
there are no co-sequences, then all quantified arithmetic statements are
true (and false). But unquantified arithmetic statements, such as "2 + 3
- 6", can fall short of truth on finite sequences (by (TU)). Thus a
portion of finite arithmetic remains usable. Indeed, it is exactly that
portion of arithmetic which can be applied in the given circumstances.
Objection 6 : The above semantics is formulated in terms of 60-sequences
.
But it is clear that it could have been formulated differently. For
instance, use could have been made of co -well-orderings Instead, (co-well-
orderings, unlike co-sequences, are transitive relations.) Or a similar
semantics could have been formulated in terms of betweenness or adja-
cency
. Thus the semantics actually given is itself somewhat artificial.
Other choices could have been made.
Reply ; Indeed, the above semantics cannot be said to capture the meaning
of arithmetic statements. However, I claim only (1) that it is far less
artificial than standard interpretations, and (2) that it illuminates
certain aspects of arithmetic truth. The objection does not contradict
these claims.
Moreover, some of the artificiality of the new semantics is removed
by the very general definition of an arithmetic notion (D2<j-D46j) . For
example, there is an arithmetic notion which, when applied to an w-se-
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quence, yields the corresponding o-well-ordering. Likewise, there are
arithmetic notions which yield the corresponding betweenness and adja-
cency relations. Although the selection of an w-sequence interpretation
is somewhat arbitrary, the full scope of arithmetic notions is ultimately
taken into account.
Possibly we could give an interpretation which is wholly free of
arbitrary elements. Consider the alternative interpretation in terms of
^*^-well-orderings
. For every w-well-ordering, there is a unique corres-
ponding w-sequence, and vice versa. Moreover, isomorphisms on w-well-
orderings are also isomorphisms on the corresponding w-sequences. Thus
the notions of the theory of W-well-orderlngs mirror those of the theory
of u)-sequences, the "notions of arithmetic" according to D2(o, D3 cj, Dl+co.
And theorems about ^u-well-orderings mirror theorems about 6i-sequences.
Therefore, we might conjecture that there is a neutral structured object
underlying each 0)-sequence and its associated u)-well-ordering. These
structured objects may be the real objects of arithmetic.
From this point of view, the w-sequence postulates are an auxiliary
apparatus. Arithmetic is concerned with those structured objects on
which "preferred" infinite sequential orderings exist. Undoubtedly these
objects can be described in other ways.
Only minor alterations are required in the proposed semantics.
References to U)-sequences in the semantical rules must be replaced by
references to the structured ^-ob jec ts . Isomorphisms of 6J-objects may
be defined as isomorphisms of the associated (u-sequences.
However, major alterations are required in standard metaphysical
schemes if structured objects are admitted. According to conventional
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views, no countably infinite collection has an objectively
-preferred"
sequential ordering. Structure simply ie not intrinsic to things; it is
exhibited only by selected orderings. Thus the notion of a structured
object, an object which has a peculiar structure independently of any
chosen description, has no currency. Nevertheless, the notion may have
a brilliant future.
In summary, the artificiality of the w-sequence interpretation does
not seem to be a serious matter, and there is hope that it will be en-
tirely overcome.
Notes
In "Mathematical Truth", Paul Benacerraf predicted that any theory
of mathematical truth will have to conform to the standard pattern estab-
lished by Tarski. His prediction has not been borne out. The semantics
given above is a perfectly sound theory of arithmetic truth, yet, in
virtue of its peculiar truth-rule, (T), it does not conform to the stan-
daurd pattern.
Ed Zalta has given an additional objection to the semantics, one
similar to Objection If there are no w-sequences, then the sentence
"There is a largest prime number" is assigned the value true by (T). But
intuitively, it is not true. Hence the semantics might not yield the
intuitive distribution of truth-values. Yet a primary purpose of giving
a semantics is to generate the intuitive distribution!
I think the correct response is that we can have a somewhat dif-
ferent aim in giving a semantics for arithmetic. Under the proposed
semantics, every arithmetic theorem is necessarily true. Thus the essen-
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tlal core of the intuitive distribution is preserved. Furthermore, the
semantics meshes well with applications of arithmetic. In view of these
features, the semantics meets the requirements of both pure mathematics
and natural science. The clash with common intuitions does not seem to
be a very serious matter.
We can preserve the intuitive distribution by interpreting arith-
metic statements as generalizations about all possible w-sequences. The
cost is a loss in simplicity because of the use of modal notions. I have
chosen a nonraodal interpretation because I think it is tenable. On the
other hand, standard interpretations, which depend on axioms of infinity,
are in serious conflict with our intuitions: The theorems of arithmetic
are intuitively certain, and axioms of infinity are not.
2. Cardinalities
There are nonarithmetical uses of number words. Prominent among
these is what may be called the cardinal use of number words. This is
the use of number words to speak of the number of things of a certain
kind. It is exemplified by statements of the form: 'There are n A's',
where 'n' is a number word and 'A' is a suitable general term.
There are various ways to interpret the cardinal use. According to
one simple interpretation, number words so used correspond to certain
notions, property-notions which apply to sets.* So to assert that there
are n A's is to assert that the set of A's possesses the property-notion
n. To say that there are three cows in the field is to say that the set
•They are proper tv-notions because they are possessed by sets of
arbitrarily high rank.
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of cows in the field satisfies the property- notion three.
These property-notions may be called cardinallti They obey two
characteristic laws:
LI For any cardinality C, and any sets x and x*
,
if there is a
one-to-one correspondence from x to x'
,
then
C. fx] iff C. fx']
L2 For cardinality C, and any sets x and x'
,
if C.[x] and
C.Lx'J, then there is a one-to-one correspondence from x to x'
.
Taken together, LI and L2 say that the sets satisfying a given cardinal-
ity form an equivalence class under one-to-one correspondence.
Finite cardinalities can be defined using quantification and iden-
tity. For example:
2. fxJ =df 3a3b(a b & Vc(c £ x •*-* c = a v c = b))
Using some more powerful notions, infinite cardinalities can be defined
as well:
)^q.£x] =df X is the field of some cj-sequence
Exactly what notions are used in this definition will become cle^,r later,
in my discussion of logicism.
I have contended that arithmetic is not about particular objects,
numbers. Cardinalities present a challenge to my contention. First,
observe that we may always pass from an assertion of the form 'There are
n A's' to a corresponding one of the form 'The number of A's is n'. This
suggests that there is a common conception of numbers as cardinalities.*
*The suggestion is not a very strong one. Quine remarks, "We can say
what it means for a class to have n members no matter how we construe the
numbers, as long as we have them in order. For to say that a class has n
members is to say that the members of the class can be correlated with
the natural numbers up to n, whatever they are."—"Ontological Reduction
and the World of Numbers"
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Second, if there is a common conception of numbers, then isn't it likely
that this conception underlies airithmetic?
Moreover, cardinalities are mathematically significant notions.
They crop up in all branches of mathematics. For example, many theorems
about groups are concerned with the orders of groups. The order of a
group is the cardinality of the set of its objects. Given the tremendous
mathematical importance of cardinalities, it is easy to suppose that
there must be a mathematical theory which deals with them exclusively,
namely arithmetic.
However, the argument that arithmetic is concerned with cardinali-
ties is not a good one. The cardinal use of number words is not their
only nonarithmetical use. Sometimes number words are used to deal with
integral values of continuous quantities. For example, we make state-
ments of the form: 'a is n miles from b', where 'n' is a number word.
Clearly this is not the cardinal use. To say that a is n miles from b is
not to say that there are n things, miles, between a and b. There are
miles between things that have nothing between them!
How shall we interpret this use of number words? Perhaps number
words so used stand for certain relational notions, proportions . To say
that a is n miles from b is to say that n is the proportion of the dis-
tance from a to b and the distance one mile. I understand distances to
be true relations. I shall say a little more about them in section 4 of
this chapter.
Observe that we may always pass from 'a is n miles from b' to 'n is
the number of miles from a to b' . Since 'n' stands for a proportion in
this context, this suggests that numbers are proportions.
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Recall the parallel aj.'gume;nt for the conclueion that numbers are
Cardinalities. Since cardinalities are distinct from proportions, one
of the arguments must be no good. Since the arguments are of the same
form, they are equally no good. Hence no compelling reason has been
gi\-en for thinking that cardinalities are the numbers.
Because finite cardinalities have a natural sequential ordering,
arithmetic has application to them. This application has a very general
utility, but there are other such applications. For example, arithmetic
can be applied to integral proportions, or to positions in sequences
( first , second , third , and so on). Each of these applications yields a
standard interpretation for arithmetic. We can construe arithmetic as a
study of cardinalities, or of integral proportions, or of positions in
sequences. However, none of these construals is entirely natural, none
tells us what the numbers really are.
If arithmetic is not about cardinalities, must there be some other
mathematical theory about them? The inclination to think that there must
be one arises from a false conception of mathematics. Mathematics is not
a study of special mathematical objects. It is a very general study of
more or less ordinary things. In that study, cardinality notions are
employed, but they are not themselves objects of any mathematical theory.
Mathematics is concerned with cardinality, but not with cardinalities.
Of course, more must be said. Cardinalities are at least apparent
objects of reference in mathematics. For instance, algebraists speak of
"the order" of a group. How are these cases of apparent reference to
be explained away?
Let us consider a particular example;
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Lyrange's Theorem If g is a finite group and h is a subgroupOf g, then the order of h is a divisor of the order of g.
Without even knowing what groups are, we can do away with the apparent
references to orders:
If g is a finite group and h is a subgroup of g, then there
exists a set x of sets of objects from g such that (1) every
object of g is contained in exactly one member of x, and (ii)
for every member s of x, there is a one-to-one correspondence
from s to the set of objects of h.
That is, to say that the order of a subgroup h divides the order of a
group g is to say that the set of objects of g can be partitioned into
h-sized pieces.
The uses of cardinalities in mathematics are many and various. It
is practically impossible to show how to dispense with every case of
apparent reference. Fortunately, the burden of proof lies on others.
They need only show an insuperable difficulty in one case.
Meanwhile, I shall stick by the conclusions of this section. Cardi-
nalities are important mathematical notions, but they need not be the
objects of any mathematical theory. Cardinalities have a predicative
role in mathematics. There are theorems about things possessing specific
cardinalities, but cardinalities are not themselves subjects of mathe-
matical assertions.
3. The Real Numbers
Natural numbers aire the most familioO' of all putative mathematicail
objects. Real numbers may be the most important. The mathematical
theory of real numbers has very extensive and direct employment in the
physical sciences. The point of view I shall taike is that the theory of
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real numbers is best interpreted not as a theory about particular objects,
real numbers, but as a theory concerning all real-nuraber-like systems.
A real-number-like system, or r-system . is an ordered triple (1, +,
<) satisfying the following axioms:*
Air + is a binary operation on the field of the binary relation
(That is, + is a binary function such that the field of is
identical to both the first and second domains of + and contains
the range of +.)
A2r For any a, b, and c in the field of <, a + ( b -* c) = (a + b) + c
.
A3r For any a and b in the field of <, a + b = b + a.
A4r There is a unique object 0 such that for any a in the field of
a + 0 = 0 + a = a.
A5r For any a in the field of •<, there is a unique object -a such
that a + -a = -a + a = 0.
A6r If a < b, then a + c < b c.
A?r If a ^ b and b < c, then a ^ c.
A8r For any a and b in the field of <, exactly one of the following
holds: a<b, b<a, ora=b.
A9r If a b, then there is a c such that a < c and c < b.
AlOr For any set s of objects from the field of <, if there exists
an a such that every member of s bears <1 to a, then there exists
a b such that for any c, if every member of s bears <to c, then
b < c or c = b.
(That is, every bounded set has a least upper bound.)
Allr For any a > 0, if s is a set such that 0 is a member of s and for
any member b of s, b + a is a member of s, then there is no
object c such that every member of s bears <to c.
A12r 0^1.
Isomorphisms of r-systems can be defined:
Ordered triples can be defined set-theoretically , at the cost of
added artificiality. Indeed, my description of r-systems involves a
number of arbitrary choices. Whether this constitutes an objection to
my interpretation depends on matters discussed in the end of section
1
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i is an isomorphism of r-systems from n, ^ +.just in case i is a one-to-one correspondence from the’ field of
<- to the field of such that for any objects a, b, and c inthe domain of i, . , lu xa
a -c b iff i(a) <’i(b)
a + b = c iff i(a) +• i(b) = i(c)
id) = 1*
The theory of real numbers can be given a nonstandard semantics. This
semantics resembles that I have given for arithmetic, except that it
involves r-systems instead of Co-sequences. Again, there are restrictions
on the interpretation of constants and primitives. For example, for any
predicate tt of the theory of real numbers, the functional notion f^n
'ft
assigned to it must obey the condition:
If i is an isomorphism of r-systems from (1, +, <) to (1',
+', <•), then for any objects a, , . .
.
,
a in the domain of i,
f^n.Cd, +, <))Ca^,..., aj iff f^n.((T, +',<’)) Ci(a^ ),...
,
i(a^)]
In this way, the theory of real numbers can be intei'preted as a general
study of r-systems.
The advantages of such an interpretation are manifest. We possess
no well-supported view that identifies real numbers as particulajr ab-
stract objects. Hence we have no reason to believe that the constants
of the theory of real numbers, such symbols as "1", "2/3", " 2", and 'V",
denote particular things, real numbers. In these circumstances, any
standard interpretation of the theory, one which assigns particular
objects to the real number constants, is a complete fabrication. The
suggested interpretation fits the evidence better. It shov/s us how the
theory can be pursued in the absence of knowledge of the nature of real
numbers. Finally, the standard Interpretations involve commitments to
the existence of objects, putative real numbers. The nonstandard inter-
25
pretation avoids these.
The real numbers are used to "construct” the spaces of real analy-
sis, for example, the space of all triples of real numbers. On the
nonstandard interpretation, theorems which are apparently about a parti-
cular space in fact embody general truths about constructions on r-sys-
tems. For instance, a theorem about "the space of triples of real num-
bers" embodies a general truth concerning any space of triples which is
formed out of the objects of an r-system. When so interpreted, the
theorems of analysis do not involve commitments to the existence of any
particular spaces. (For a treatment of metric spaces, see the Notes of
this section.)
A portion of the theory of real numbers, that which treats nonnega-
tive reals, is useful in dealing with physical quantities. This portion
can be construed as a theory about all nnr-systems . An nnr-system is a
triple (1, +,<) satisfying Alr-A4r, A6r-A12r, and the following replace-
ment for A5r:
A5nnr If a b = 0, then a = 0 and b = 0.
Having isolated the notion of an nnr-system, it is easy to give the
corresponding nonstandard semantics for the theory of nonnegative reals.
The first component of an nnr-system is a unit, 1. In the case of
many physical quantities, there appears to be no natural unit. The
mathematical study of such quantities is the theory of unitless n_nr-
sys terns . A unitless nnr-system is a pair ( + ,-2:) satisfying A1r-A4r,
A5nnr, and A6r-A11r.
In the theory of unitless nnr-systems, there are no individual
constants other than the symbol "0". This is so because for any nonzero
I
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object c of a unitless nnr-system ( + ,<), and any distinct unitless
nnr-system ( + •
,
<»), there is no unique object c' of (+', <*) which may
be said to play the same role in ( + ', <•) as does c in (+,<).
Let me explain. For any two unitless nnr-systems there are infi-
nitely many isomorphisms between them. Zero objects are mapped to zero
objects by all isomorphisms, but nonzero objects have no unique corres-
pondents under all isomorphisms. This can be verified from the defini-
tion of isomorphisms for unitless nnr-systems:
Dlnnr i is an isomorphism of unitless nnr-systems from (+, <) to
) just in case i is a one-to-one correspondence from
the field of < to the field of <' such that for any objects
a, b, and c in the domain of i,
a + b = c iff i(a) +' i(b) = i(c)
a < b iff i(a) <' i(b)
For any nonzero object c of a unitless nnr-system (•'•,<), and any nonzero
object d of a unitless nnr-system ( + ', <'), there is an isomorphism which
maps c to d. Hence there is no unique correspondent of c under all iso-
morphisms.
Recall that there is a restriction on the interpretation of con-
stants in our mathematical theories:
If i is an isomorphism from ( +
,
<) to ( + ', then
i(f^.((^, <))) =
Because of the fact just mentioned, this condition cannot be satisfied
if the constant k does not pick out, from unitless nnr-system to unitless
nnr-system, the zero object of each system.
Since the theory of unitless nnr-systems has but one constant, it




A metric space is normally taken to be a binary function whose
domains are identical, and whose range is a subset of the nonnegative
reals. Since I do not admit the existence of nonnegative reals, I must
construe metric spaces differently.
A metric space is an ordered pair (d, (1, +, <)) satisfying the
postulates:
Aim (1, +,<) is an nnr-system, and d is a function whose domains
are identical, and whose range is a subset of the field of
A2m For any objects a and b in the domains of d, if a b, then
0 < d(a, b)
,
where 0 is the identity element of +(as in Aifr)
.
A3m For any object a in the domains of d, 0 = d(a, a).
A4m For any objects a and b in the domains of d, d(a, b) = d(b, a).
A5m For any objects a, b, and c in the domains of d,
d(a, b) + d(b, c) ^ d(a, c).
Isomorphisms are easily defined:
Dim An isomorphism of metric spaces from (d, (l, +,-2)) to (d*,
(I'j +’,<')) is a pair (i, J) such that J is an isomorphism
of nnr-sys terns from (1, +,<) to (!', +•, c'), i is a one-to-
one correspondence from the domains of d to the domains of d',
and for any objects a and b in the domain of i,
J(d(a, b) ) = d'(i(a), i(b))
A unitless metric space is an ordered pair (d, ( +
,
<-)) which satis-
fies axioms similar to Alm-A5m. The sole difference is that the second
coordinate of a unitless metric space, is a unitless nnr-system.
It is interesting to note that under standard construals of metric
spaces, there is no separate class of unitless metric spaces. Unitless
metric space theory can be given a standard development only by ignoring
the special status of the real number one. My approach is more natural.
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4. Does Ptivsics Require Real NumbftrR?
On the face of it, a measurement is an association of a real number
with an object or pair of objects. For example, to measure the mass of
an object is to assign the object a real number, a real number which
represents the mass with respect to a chosen unit. To measure the dis-
tance between two objects is to assign them a real number, a real number
representing the distance with respect to a chosen unit. Thus the facts
of measurement suggest an argument in favor of the real numbers: We have
good reason to believe the pronouncements of physical science. But
physical science is based on measurement, and measurement requires the
existence of real numbers. Hence we should believe in the existence of
real numbers.— If this cirgument is good, then there is reason to believe
that the theory of real numbers jLs about particular objects, real num-
bers, contrary to what I have said.




'•If the numericalization of physical magnitudes is to make sense,
we must accept such notions as function and real number; and
these are just the notions the nominalist rejects." p. 43
I find the argument for this conclusion to be unsound. Science does not
need real numbers.* The facts of measurement can be otherwise explained.
Indeed, the alternative explanation is a better one.
Intuitively, the mass of an object is a property it possesses, a
property it shares with all objects of equal mass. All the masses that
•Science does seem to presuppose the literal truth of some parts of
classical, mathematics, so Putnam's realism may survive my criticism.
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objects can have form a continuum. On this continuum, there is a natural
ordering relation One mass bears to another just in case it is a
mass of lighter objects than the other. There is also a natural additive
operation +^. For any masses and is the mass any aggre-
gate would have if it consisted of two discrete objects of masses and
The interplay of and can be checked on a balance. We learn
either is or approximates a unitless nnr-system. It is
this knowledge which makes mass measurements and their manipulation
possible, not knowledge of an aissociation between physical objects and
special mathematical, objects, real numbers.
By arbitrarily selecting a unit mass 1
,
we obtedn an nnr-system
m
(lm» theory of nonnegative reals has direct application to
this system of masses. Since that theory can be interpreted in a non-
standard way, we need not suppose that the application proceeds via an
association with real numbers.




< ) is just as complex as the
m m m
system of nonnegative reals is supposed to be, explaining measurement in
terms of the first rather than the second is not a straightforward case
of economizing. From one point of view, it is the very opposite of
economizing. To be consistent, I must explain distance measurements in
terms of another nnr-system, (1^, then we have two complex
systems instead of a single system of the nonnegative reals.
In fact, it has been suggested, in the interest of ontological econ-
omy, that we dispense with the "impure" systems in favor of the "pure"
*I am ignoring relativistic effects. They introduce complications
which are irrelevant here.
I
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system of nonnegative reals. This is known as the reduction of impure
numbers^^, masses, distances, and so forth, to "pure numbers", the non-
negative reals.*
Each such reduction must be accompanied by an account of the non-
negative reals. Since evidence on the nature of real numbers is very
slim, these accounts are bound to be artificial. However, this is not a
serious problem for the proponents of reduction. They care little how
we choose to construe the real numbers, so long as we choose one con-
strual over the various impure systems.
The outstanding problem for reductionists is one of establishing the
existence of certain objects, namely those required by their accounts of
the real numbers. According to the most well-known accounts, real num-
bers are infinite pure sets, sets founded solely on the empty set. But
reductionists have done little to demonstrate the existence of pure sets.
They only point out the convenience of pure sets, the fact that pure sets
yield simple interpretations for the statements of mathematical physics.
However, the need for interpretation does not specifically support the
existence of pure sets, since other entities might also provide simple
interpretations.
I think that a rational belief in the existence of pure sets must be
based on prior acceptance of a full-blown Platonism. That is, only a
view that admits properties, relations, and functions can yield up pure
sets as well.** If this is correct, we shall not be able to reduce
*See Quine's "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers".
**In ch. Ill, s. 6, I shall identify sets with "degenerate" proper-
ties and identify pure sets with "degenerate" cases of thosel
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the impure systems of masses, distances, and so forth to pure systems.
The objects of impure systems, such as masses and distances, are proper
ties and relations, and they belong to the "main line" of Platonic
unaversals. We cannot dispense with them in favor of the more exotic
pure objects, such as pure sets.
Why, indeed, would we want to? The impure systems of masses and
distances are intimately connected with empirical reality. It strikes
me that they are on a somewhat sounder footing than the pure systems
concocted by the reductionists, and so provide a better interpretation
of the facts of measurement.
Notes
While we are on the topic of impure systems, it might be useful to
look at impure varieties of metric spaces. This will be a natural con-
tinuation of the Notes of the preceding section, in which metric spaces
were defined.
Of special scientific interest are material metric spaces
. These
correspond to arrangements of particles in physical space:
Dlim (d, (1^, +^, ^^)) is a material metric space just in case it is
a metric space in which (1^, +^, is the nnr-system of physi-
cal distances (or, if one prefers, that of spatiotemporal inter-
vals)
,
and only fundamental units of matter are members of the
domains of d.
The arrangement corresponding to a material metric space actually obtains
just in case the particles in the domain of the d-function do indeed
exhibit the distances which the d-function assigns to them. When this
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happens, we may say that the material metric space is actualized ;
D2im A material metric space (d, (1^, is actualized Just in
case for any particles a and b in the domain of d,
d(a, b) Ta, bj
(that is, a bears the relation d(a, b) to b, where d(a, b) is
a certain distance relation)
Notice that this treatment of material metric spaces involves no appeal
to pure mathematical objects.
3. More Putative Mathematical Objects
Even statements of abstract algebra sometimes contain apparent
references to particular objects. For example, a book on group theory
might contain the statement:
The sixth symmetric group is the smallest symmetric group which
contains a subgroup of order nine.
Here the phrase "the sixth symmetric group" seems to denote a particular
group.
Must we conclude that group theory is concerned with certain mathe-
matical objects, groups? Fortunately, there is a paraphrase which lacks
the singular term in question;
All and only sixth symmetric groups are smallest symmetric
groups containing subgroups of order nine.
The original statement was not really about a specific group. It was
about a specific sort of group. The notion of such a group is a mathe-
matical notion, but there is no unique corresponding object. Thus the
original statement was somewhat misleading. The paraphrase captures most
of its content.
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aiven the availability of such simple paraphrases, we might well
wonder why algebraists often prefer the apparent singular terms. Singu-
lar terms are used to indicate the fact that the groups in question are
"unique up to isomorphism". This Is not to say that the groups, which
are many, are one. It is simply to say that they are all isomorphic in
the group sense. In the above example, sixth symmetric groups are iso-
morphic. This fact is either stated or presupposed by the original
statement, so the paraphrase is not entirely faithful. Nevertheless,
having seen why the paraphrase is not completely faithful, we see quite
clearly what it was Intended to show: The original statement is not
concerned with a specific group.
A group ie any associative binary operation + with an identity
element and inverses:*
Alg + is a binary operation.
A2g For any a, b, and c in the domains of +,
a (b + c) = (a + b) + c.
A3g There is a unique object 0 such that for any a in the domains
of +, a + 0 = 0 + a = a.
A4g For any object a in the domains of +, there is a unique object
-a such that a + -a = -a + a = 0.
Obviously a group need not be a purely mathematical object. We encounter
groups in many concrete situations.
Isomorphisms of groups are easily defined:
Dig i is an isomorphism of groups from -r to +’ just in case i is a
one-to-one correspondence between the objects in the domains of
and the objects in the domains of +' such that for any objects
•Usually a group is taken to be a pair (x, +)
,
where x is the set of
objects on which the operation + operates. But separate mention of x is
not necessary, since it is both the first and second domain of +.
a, b, and c in the domain of i,
a + b = c iff i(a) +• i(b) = i(c)
Two groups are isomorphic if there is an isomorphism from one to the
other.
A paradigmatic sixth symmetric group is any group of all rearrange-
ments, or permutations
, of some given six objects. Obviously there may
be many sixth symmetric groups in existence. Nevertheless, all sixth
symmetric groups are isomorphic to one another. Algebraists tend to
denote them using a singular term, "the sixth symmetric group", because
such groups are indistinguishable from the standpoint of group theory.
These remarks can be generalized. Apparent reference to specific
objects in abstract algebra results from a convenient "lumping together"
of isomorphic objects. Mathematicians are usucLLly quite conscious of
this "lumping together" process. They do not confuse "unique up to
isomorphism" with "strictly unique".
Nevertheless, this very same "lumping together" process, operating
nonconsciously
,
could be responsible for the illusion that arithmetic is
concerned with a specific collection of objects, the natural numbers, and
that the theory of real numbers is concerned with a specific continuum,
the real numbers. I have proposed that arithraetic is about all sequences
of a certain sort, all u>-sequences. Because all cu-sequences are isomor-
phic, they are easily lumped together under the term "the sequence of
natural numbers". After all, there is no arithmetical distinction
between diverse (o-sequences . Similarly, all real-number-like systems, or
r—systems, are isomorphic. Hence it is easy to denote them with an
apparent singular term, "the continuum of real numbers".
35
The fundamental source of the mistaken belief that there are parti,
cular mathematical objects may be this natural tendency to "identify"
isomorphic objects. Mathematicians cultivate this tendency, because it
is convenient. Philosophers should master it, because it can lead to
confusion.
6. Pure Sets
Pure sets are the apparent objects of set theory. They include the
empty set, 0, and all sets founded upon it, l0], ^0, f0}j, and
infinitely many others. Typical formulations of set theory assert the
existence of the empty set and at least one infinite set.
Should set theory be treated in the way I have treated other mathe-
matical theories? Should it be interpreted not as a theory of particular
objects, but as a theory concerning all systems of a certain sort? For
several reasons, this may not be a good idea.
First, set theory is normally conceived as a universal "background
theory" for mathematics. It is difficult to reconcile this conception
with the idea that set theory is a general theory of set-systems. For
example, recall that we employed set theory to define (^-sequences and
r-systems. This is clear in the Axiom of Induction, A5w, and the Axiom
of Continuity, AT Or. If the set theory so used were a general theory of
set-systems, then we would only have defined "^^)-sequence relative to a
set-system" and "r-system relative to a set-system". There is no very
appealing way to recover the absolute notions from these.
For instance, suppose we define n;-sequences in the absolute sense
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as "0)-sequences relative to st^dard set-systems".* Here the notion of
standardness cries out for explanation. Typically standardness is de-
fined via some background theory: A standard set-system is one that
contains no infinite descending 6-chain, ... ^
€ x^. However
we choose to spell out what a "chain" is, the background theory is bound
to bring with it the idea of a definite realm of abstract entities. Thus
we might just as well have stuck with a background set theory, one con-
cerned with a definite universe of sets.
Alternatively, we might simply refuse to explain what standard
set-systems are. This radical course seems somewhat out of place, since
we have decided to define other mathematical systems, such as tAi-sequences
and r-systems.
Second, set theory is not purely postulational
. For every pro-
perty P we encounter in applications, we may assert outright the exis-
tence of a set of all objects exemplifying P. Then the general laws of
sets assure us of the existence of an entire system founded on the set of
P's. Thus set theory is not the study of set-systems whether they exist
or not, but tells us something about the conditions under which systems
of sets exist. These conditions are not stringent: Every property P
gives rise to an extensive set system.
What justification is there for this conviction, that every property
gives rise to a set-system? No answer is provided by the view that set
theory is a general theory of set-systems. According to that view, sets
•^-sequences of standard set systems are isomorphic to one another
and so may qualify as ^-sequences in the absolute sense. But co-sequences
relative to nonstandard set-systems may not belong to the same isomor-
phism class.
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are merely elements of systems obeying certain postulates. No special
character is attributed to them which might account for the omnipresence
of set-systems. On the other hand, the more usual views of sets promise
some relief. According to them, a set is a special sort of abstract
entity. Whenever the members of a set exist and are in a certain sense
j




for every property P and of a system founded on that set.
i| Third, mathematics needs some background theory. The postulates of
mathematical theories contain certain universal notions. For instance,
the postulates for groups contain the notion of the result of applying a
binary operation to a pair of ob.iects . The laws governing these univer-
|!




theory has been regarded as a specially interesting part of this back-
ground. As such, it is a theory of a definite universal notion, the
I
notion of set membership, and of a definite realm of objects, sets,
j
Therefore, I shall not treat set theory in the way that I have
I
j
treated other mathematical theories. It is not a theory of all set-
(
systems. It is a theory about a very broad but definite realm of
objects, sets. However, I shall argue that we do not need a set theory
I
,
which is specially concerned with pure sets.
1 Set theory v;as developed to serve as a "foundation" for mathematics.
I
Those who developed it thought that a foundation must include natural
I
j
numbers and real numbers. They chose to construe numbers as certain pure
j
sets. They realized that this construal is entirely artificial. Their
I project, however, was not one of capturing "the meaning" of arithmetic
I
I
statements or of ordinary numerical discourse. They wished to show only
I
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that standard interpretations are available for arithmetic and the theory
of real numbers.
Why did they choose pure sets to be the numbers? Why didn't they
choose, for example, sets of concrete objects? It is generally agreed
that a set exists only if all its members do. If numbers were construed
as sets of concrete objects, their existence would not be certain. That
would be contrary to the certitude of arithmetic theorems. Hence numbers
should not be so construed.
On the other hand, consider the empty set. It has no members. If
it fails to exist, it does not fail on account of its members failing to
exist. But how else could it fail to exist? Many would say that there
is no other way, and so conclude that the empty set exists of necessity.
Now consider the other pure sets. These are founded on the empty
set alone. It is difficult to see how their existence could depend on
any contingent circumstance. With these sets, too, it is easy to con-
clude that they exist of necessity. Thus if numbers are pure sets, their
existence appears guaranteed. Such a construal promises to preserve the
certitude of arithmetic theorems.
This line of reasoning is very suspicious. I doubt that it can be
elaborated in a convincing way. For instance, suppose it is based on the
following principle:
The set of F's exists if and only if all the F's exist.
This entails the existence of the empty set, since that set has no mem-
bers. It also entails the existence of the various pure sets, since
their members are ultimately founded on the empty set. Unfortunately,
once the existence of the pure sets is secured, the principle entails the
39
existence of a set of them, a universal pure set. Contradictions soon
follow.
Even if pure sets are necessary existents, there is no reason to
interpret number theory in terms of them. We have seen some nonstandard
interpretations that are far more natural. They too preserve the certi-
tude of arithmetic theorems, not by arbitrary selection of necessary
existents to be "the numbers", but by presenting arithmetic truths as
generalizations concerning all number—like sequences.
Set theory is not needed to provide objects for arithmetic, or for
any other branch of mathematics. Mathematics simply is not concerned
with specific objects. Thus there is no point in interpreting numbers
as pure sets, and no point to a special interest in pure sets.
If set theory is not to be treated as a study of set-like systems
nor as a study of pure sets, how should it be pursued? Set theory is
indeed very useful in mathematics, not as a study of pure sets, but as a
study of the general laws of sets, pure and impure. All familiar prin-
ciples concerning pure sets can be extended to cover impure sets. And in
practice, they certainly are.
A typical mathematical theory is concerned with all systems of a
certain sort. Thus group theory is about all groups, and the theory of
real numbers is about all r-systems. The objects of these systems need
not be pure sets. Hence references to sets founded on these systems
extend to impure sets. Since such references are common in mathematical
theories, mathematics does deal with impure sets.
For instance, consider the quantification over sets which appears in
the axioms of ^o-sequences. This quantification is not restricted to pure
40
set.. The axiom, are not Intended to cover only co-.equence. oI pure .et
theory. Some relation among physical object, might .atisfy the axioms.
If one does, then axiom A5<o can be applied to set. of physical objects,
sets which are manifestly impure. Such an application may Involve gen-
eral set theoretic laws, such as the axioms of Power Set, Union, Keplace-
ment, and Extenslonality. Their application to impure sets involves no
difficulties.
In set theory, as in other branches of mathematics, there is no need
for special objects. And in so far as mathematics requires set theoretic
foundations, it requires a theory of sets pure and impure.
CHAPTER II
ABSTRACT STRUCTURE AND THE NOTIONS OF MATHEJ'IATICS
1 . Typical Branches of Mathemati ch
^ 'typical brancn of mathematics, I mean a mathematical theory
v/hich does not have a special foundational role, one which is not inten-
ded to serve as a "background theory" for all of mathematics. Examples
of typical branches are numerous: group theory, topology. Euclidean
geometry, arithmetic, the theory of real numbers, and many others. A tyo '
ical branches, the foundational theories, are few in number. Set theory
is the prime example. Category theory, a more recent development, also
has a foundational character. Perhaps logic may be counted among these
as well.
Typical branches of mathematics share a number of features, which
are conveniently exhibited by the three examples of the preceding chap-
ter, arithmetic, the theory of real numbers, andgroup theory. A know-
ledge of these features v/ill lead to a more comprehensive understanding
of mathematics.
A typical branch of mathematics is concerned with all systems of a
certain sort. Usually this concern is explicit in the associated theo-
rems. Theorems of group theory are obviously generalizations about
groups. Theorems of topology are explicit generalizations about topo-
logical spaces.
In the cases of arithmetic and the theory of real numbers, the
general concern with systems is disguised. Theorems of these branches
41
42
appear to be about particular objects, natural or real nurabers. As I
have argued in the preceding chapter, this appearence is deceptive.
There is no natural interpretation of these theorems according to which
they are about numbers. However, there are natural nonstandard inter-
pretations. According to the interpretation I proposed for arithmetic,
arithmetic theorems are about all 6)-sequences. According to r,he inter-
pretation I proposed for the theory of real numbers, real number tneoreras
are about all r-systems. Thus, under natural interpretations, each of
these theories is concerned v/ith all systems of a certain kind.
Of course, the notion of a ’’system*' is very general. A group is
simply a binary operation. An bJ-sequence is just a binary relation. On
the other hand, r-systems are complex. An r-system is a triple of an
object, an operation, and a relation. Other mathematical theories deal
with still more complex systems. In each case, however, the complex
systems can be regarded as n-tuples of objects, functions, relations, and
sets.
Each typical branch of mathematics is associated with one or more
sets of postulates, postulates describing the corresponding systems. For
example, A)-sequences, the systems of arithmetic, are completely described
by the Dedekind-Peano axioms Alw-A5c>>. Groups are completely described by
the postulates Alg-A4s; r-systems, by the postulates A1r-A12r.
The postulates of mathematical theories are of a very special sort.
Some, such as the postulates for groups, can be formulated schematically
in elementary logic. Others contain set theoretic notions. This is true
of the Axiom of Induction, A5b), and the Axiom of Continuity, AlOr. But
in no case do the postulates appeal to notions beyond those of logic and
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set theory (except perhaps to higher-order logic, which, in the absence
of modalities, is no more powerful than set theory).
It is sometimes said that the postulates of mathematical theories
are "purely formal". This terminology is somewhat misleading. Mathe-
matical postulates are "formal" in the sense that they employ only uni-
versal notions, the notions of logic and set theory. They are also
"formal" in the sense that they are not categorically asserted. They are
used to characterize the systems of a mathematical theory. They are not
asserted of any individual system, except in applications.
However, mathematical postulates need not be "formal" in the strict
logician's sense. Some contain notions of set theory. Since those
notions do not belong to elementary logic, such postulates are not formal
in the strict sense. For example, the Axiom of Induction, A3o, contains
a quantification over sets.* There is no purely formal way to represent
the content of that axiom, not even by .means of axiom schemata.
We have concluded that the theorems of mathematics are generali-
zations, or disguised generalizations, 'All Fs are G', where the Fs are
systems characterized by set theoretic postulates. 'He have yet to say
what notions may enter into the second parts of these generalizations,
the 'G"s.
That there is some restriction on those notions is suggested by our
examination of arithmetic. We found that the notions assigned to arith-
metic primitives must be "preserved" under w-sequence isomorphisms. In
*It can be stated with a quantification over properties instead, but
the notion of a property no more belongs to elementary logic than the
notion of a set.
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precise terms:
For any isomorphism of w-sequences i from B to R',
(i) if f is an object notion of arithmetic, then
i(f.(R)) = f.(R’)






a^, in the domain of i,
f.(R)(a
,
a ) a iff f
.
(R* ) (i(a ) , . . . , i(a )) = i(a ,)
^^44) 4F f is an n-ary relation notion of arithmetic, then for
any objects a
,
a in the domain of i,
f
. (R) £a^
, . . .
,
a^3 iff f • (R' ) [i(a^ ) , . . . , i(a^)J
This restriction on arithmetic interpretations accomplishes three things.
First, it prevents the occurrence of truth-value gaps. Second, it iso-
lates the proper notions of arithmetic. Third, it ameliorates the ef-
fects of our somewhat arbitrary choice of arithmetic postulates, Al4)-A5oo
(see ch. I, s. 1, Objection 6).
The first gain is peculiar to arithmetic and its disguised generali-
zations. But the remaining two can be reproduced by isomorphism restric-
tions on other mathematical theories. The general principle regarding
the notions of mathematical theories is:
Pi In the mathematical theory of Fs
,
for any isomorphism of F-sys-
tems i from F to F'
,
(i) if f is an object notion of F-theory, then
i(f.CF)) = f.(F')
(ii) if f is an n-ary operation (or, more generally, function )




in the domain of i,
f.(F)(a^,..., = a^^^ iff f . (F- ) (i (a^ ) , . . .
,
i(a^)) - i(a^^,)
(iii) j.f f is an n-ary relation notion of F-theory, then for
any objects a^ , . .
.
,
a^ in the domain of i.
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f.(F)[a a ] iff f.(F')[i(a, i(a )] *
To see how this works, consider the notion of an identity element in
group theory. This is an object notion of group theory. It is a func-
tional notion id which maps each group + to its identity element, 0. It
is easy to show that id satisfies Pl(i):
For any isomorphism of groups i from + to +•
,
and object a in
the domain of i,
i(ijd
. ( + ) ) = ( + •
)
Another notion of group theory is the inverse notion. It is a unary
operation notion of group theory. It maps each group + to a function
that maps each object a of the group - to its inverse in -, that is, to
that object b such that aTb=b+a=0, where 0 is the identity ele-
ment of +. This notion satisfies Pl(ii):
For any isomorphism of groups i from + to and objects a
and b in the domain of i,
inv
. ( + ) (a) = b iff inv . (-*•* ) (i(a) ) = i(b)
In a mathematical generalization 'All Fs are G'
,
the 'G' may contain
any of the special notions of F-theory. However, the 'G''s cannot be
confined to those notions v/hich satisfy PI . PI describes only the first-
order notions of each mathematical theory. If a notion satisfies Pi
,
then it picks out, from F-system to F-system, some object of that system,
or some function or relation on the objects of that system. A higher-
order notion of F-theory might pick out, in each F-systera, a function or
relation on sets of objects from that system. Such notions do not fall
*P1 does not apply directly to metric spaces. An isomorphism of
metric spaces is a pair of functions (i, J), and so has no true domain,
.lowever, we might choose to regard the "domain" of the pair to be the
union of their domains, and then apply PI accordingly.
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under principle Pi. Since higher-order developinents are the everyday
practice of mathematicians, we clearly need to extend PI.
Let i be an isomorphism of F-theory. Then the £
-extension of i, i^,
is a functional notion such that:
(I) For any object a in the domain of i, i^. (a) = i(a).
(II) For any set x of objects mapped by i^,
i£. (x) = (y) : y fc x] *
(III) i^ maps no objects other than those forced by (I) and (II).
That is, i£ is the natural extension of i to all sets founded on the
objects in its domain.**
I assume that the iiigher-order notions of a mathematical theory are
concerned with sets founded on the associated systems. I call these
notions collective notions :
P2 A collective notion x of the mathematical theory of Fs is a
functional notion which maps F-systems to sets, and for any
F-isomorphism i from F to F’
,
and any y in the domain of i ,
y x.(F) iff i^.(y) £ x.(F')
An example of a collective notion is the notion of a subgroup . It maps
each group -i- to the set of all @ such that (1) @ is a binary operation in
the set theoretic sense, a set of ordered triples, (2) @ is a group, and
( 3 ) Tor all a, b, and c, if a ® b = c, then a + b = c. This notion
satisfies P2:
*If 9 is a functional formula and « denotes a set, then "[f : y e cx]"
denotes the "range" of 9 on the set x. ^
**The 6-extensions of isomorphisms outstrip the ranks of set theory
and are rather more numerous than any symbolic constructions. This is a
source of some discomfort. Fortunately, the restrictions of 6-extensions
to a given rank of set theory are genuine functions. Those restrictions
may be sufficient for practical purposes.
k7
For any isomorphism of groups i from + to +'
domain of i^, ’
and any @ in the
@esu^.( + ) iff i^. (@) £ su^.( + »)
Because a subgroup @ is an operation in the set theoretic sense, it does
fall in the domain of i^. The restriction to set theoretic operations is
not harmful. ihis insures that subgroups obey extensionality
,
something
which mathematicians generally assume. They assume it, for example, when
counting the subgroups of a given group.
It is quite essential that we be in possession of such collective
notions. The elementary theory of groups is uninteresting. Only the
higher-order developments are really fruitful.
Notice that set theory plays a key role in the treatment of higher-
order notions. This is a sure sign that set theory is my "background
theory". The "background theory" is the theory in which "constructions"
are made on the elementary systems.
Our description of typical branches of mathematics is now complete.
A typical branch contains several elements:
The mathematical theory of F-systems contains:
(a) Set theoretic postulates which define F-systems.
(b) Isomorphisms of F-systeras.
(c) Elementary notions of F-theory, notions which are preserved
under F-isomorphisms.
(d) Higher-order notions of F-theory, notions which are pre-
served under t -extensions of F-isomorphisms.
(e) Theorems of the form 'All Fs are G', where 'G' contains
only notions of F-theory.
Mathematical theories can be developed in which (b), (c), and (d) are
replaced by set theory itself, so that theorems contain only rnotions
appearing in the basic postulates plus notions of set theory. Hov;ever,
we would find them rather artificial. The actual selection of systems
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and defining postulates for a nathenatical theory involves a number of
arbitrary choices. For example, I construed arithmetic as the general
study of oi-sequences, when I might just as easily have construed it as
the general study of 0)-well-orderings. The effects of such choices are
ameliorated when we acknowledge the full scope of the special notions of
the theory in question. For example, the notion of an cu-well-ordering is
no less a part of arithmetic than is the notion of an 6>-sequence. But
acknov/ledging the full scope of the special notions involves developing
the notion of isomorphism appropriate for that theory. Thus (b)
,
(c),
and (d) are natural components of any typical mathematical theory.
Indeed, we might contemplate the opposite sort of economy, doing
away v/ith the defining postulates of mathematical theories. We might
choose to develop theories directly out of some interesting notions of
isomorphism. Sometimes this is quite possible from a purely mathematical
standpoint.'* Nevertheless, fruitful mathematical theories generally
receive some inspiration from the sciences, and the sciences usually
provide mathematicians with postulates, not undigested notions of iso-
morphism. So postulates will remain a part of our mathematical theories,
at least for the near future.
Notes
What is the precise relationship of physical and mathematical
*In his Erlanger Program (l872), Felix Klein suggested that every
geometrical theory can be developed from its associated automorphisms
,
isomorphisms of spaces onto themselves. This influential approach does
not work well for complex geometries, since automorphisms of the relevant
spaces £xre few and uninteresting. Perhaps category theory, in which
isomorphisms are but a special case of the more general morphism_s, v/ill
succeed where the Erlanger Program failed.
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theories? A physical theory says that all physical systems of a certain
kind are systems of such-and-such a mathematical theory. For example:
For any time t and set of fundamental particles x. if d is afunction v;hich maps any objects a and b in x to their distance
at t, and (1 + ) is the nnr-system of spatial distances,
then
^^d’ "'"d’ "^d^ ^ ^ metric space.
The relations and functions of the physical theory are the results of
^PPlyiag relation notions and function notions of the mathematical theory
to the relevent physical systems.
2. Mathematics as the Study of Abstract Structure
V/hat constitutes the subject matter of mathematics, if not mathe-
matical objects? According to one promising new view, mathematics is
concerned v/ith abstract structure .* But what is abstract structure, and
what is it for mathematics to be concerned solely with it?
Let us tackle the second question first. We have found that mathe-
matics is not concerned with special objects. Mathematical laws are
generalisations about rather ordi.nary things. However, mathematics is
not concerned with all general aspects of ordinary things. Some laws
about ordinary things belong to the special sciences. The hypothesis
we are now considering is that mathematics is only concerned with the
abstract structurail aspects of things. That is, the notions involved in
mathematical generalizations pertain only to these structural aspects.
What does this mean? I thinlt we may give it the follov/ing interpretation
*The view can be found in Bourbaki's Elements of Mathematics , espe-
cially the volume on sets. I first came across it in Michael Jubien's
"Ontology and Mathematical Truth".
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No mathematical notion distinsuishes objects that have the same abstract
structure. Or, so as not to give the impression of hypostatizing struc-
ture: No mathematical notion distinguishes objects that are abstractly
isomorphic
. Thus if N is a mathematical notion, and R and R' are ab-
stractly isomorphic objects, then R satisfies N if and only if R' satis-
fies N.
The main difficulty v/ith this hypothesis is that of specifying the
relevant notion of isomorphism. In our examination of typical branches
of mathematics, we found many types of isomorphism. The isomorphisms of
a mathematical theory are mappings which "preserve" the special notions
of that theory. They are also said to "preserve" the relevant sort of
structure. <l)-sequence iso.morphisms preserve arithmetic notions and
aritiraetic structure, group isomorphisms preserve group theory notions
and group structure, and so on. How can we fit these many notions of
isomorphism into one view of abstract isomorphism?
We might say that the isomorphisms of particular mathematic?!,
theories are species of a single genus, abstract isomorphisms. However,
this proposal does not get us very far. We have not said which sorts of
isomorphism are abstract.
Clearly there are nonmathematical sorts of isomorphism. Examples
are easy to construct. For example, we can define "friendsliip isomor-
phisms" :
i is a friendship isomorphism from a set of people x to a set
of people y -df i is a one-to-one correspondence from x to
y such that for any objects a and b in its domain,
a is a friend of b iff i(a) is a friend of i(b)
Surely these have no mathematical significance.
51
More seriously, there are isomorphisms of physical systems, isomor-
phisms which preserve various physical notions. These, too, are not
mathematical. They are not sufficiently abstract.
The mathematical isomorpnisms we have seen do have a common char-
acter. Arithmetic isomorphisms are just isomorphisms of relations (D1).
Group theory isomorphisms are just isomorphisms of functions :
D2 i is an isomorphism of n-ary functions from f to f =df i is
a one-to-one correspondence from the union of the domains and
range of f to the union of the domains and range of f such that




a in the domain of i,
1 n n+ 1 ’
f(a^,..., a^) -= iff f
'
(i(a^ ) , . . . , i(a^))
(So in the case of groups we have:
a a = a, iff i(a ) +' i(a ) = i(a^) )
I ci 5 1 2 3
R-system isomorphisms are only slightly more complex. An isomorphism i
from an r-system (1, to an r-system (!', +',<') satisfies three
conditions: (i) It maps 1 to 1'. (ii) It is an isomorphism of functions
from + to +'. (iii) It is an isomorphism of relations from < to <' . All
three sorts of isomorphism fit into a general scheme, that which includes
isomorphisms of relations, isomorphisms of functions, and compounds
thereof (possibly preserving units).
We might therefore conjecture that all mathematical iso.morphisms fit
into this general scheme:
The systems of the mathematical theory of Fs are n-tuples (X^
,






X ) to (Y , . . . , Y ) is a function i suchInin
that (i) i maps each unit in X^ to the corresponding unit in Y^,
and (ii) for any m such that 1 <i m ^ n, if X^ is a function,
i is an isomorphism of functions from X^^ to Y^, and if X^ is a
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relation, i is an isomorphism of relations from X to Y
m m'
According to this view, mathematics is concerned with structure generated
by arbitrary relations, functions, and units. Since the nature of these
relations, functions and units is not specified, this is indeed a view
according to which mathematics is concerned with abstract structure.
Unfortunately, this view is not general enough. It fails in cne
case of point-set topology. Point-set topology deals with certain prop-
erties of sets, properties satisfying the following axioms:
Alt If X possesses the property P, then x is a set.
A2t The empty set, 0 , possesses P.
A3t If X possesses P, and y possesses P, then the intersection of
X and y possesses F.
A4t If z is a set of sets that have P, then the union of the sets
in z has P.
A property which satisfies these axioms may be called a topology .
If we cast topological isomorphisms into the scheme suggested above,
v/e obtain a special case of the isomorphism of relations:
i is an isomorphism from a topology P to a topology Q just in
case i is a one-to-one correspondence from the instances of P
to the instances of Q such that for any object a in the domain
of i
,
#. P(a) iff Q(i(a))
(Of course, ^ follows from the fact that i is a one-to-one
correspondence!
)
Using this, it follows that two topologies are isomorphic just in case
each has the same number of instances, each has the same cardinality!
This result is absurd. For instance, it implies that the topology of a
line is the same as that of a plane.
An isomorphism of topologies is not a simple isomorphism of prop-
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erties. A topology is, after all, a property of sets. It has, from the
point of view of topology, additional structure beyond the number of its
instances. A stronger notion of isomorphism is needed to preserve that
structure
:
Dlt i is an isomorphism from a topology P to a topology Q zrdf ±
is a one-to-one correspondence from the instances of P and the
members of instances of P to the instances of Q and the .nembers




X iff i(a) e i(x)
These isomorphisms are mappings not only on the instances of properties,
but also on the members of those instances. They preserve a finer struc-
ture. In fact, they preserve enough structure to serve as isomorphisms
for topology.
Different sorts of isomorphism preserve different degrees of struc-
ture. Many mathematical theories are concerned only v;ith v/ays in which
objects may be ordered by relations and functions. Their isomorphisms
are of the sort specified in the general scheme above. Topology does not
fit into this scheme. It is concerned not only with the partitions gen-
erated by certain properties, but also with membership in the instances
of those properties. Its isomorphisms go "one level deeper". Could we
say then that all isomorphisms are of the "function-relation" type or the
"one level deeper" type? Undoubtedly we can imagine mathematical isomor-
phisms that violate this nev/ scheme, ones that go "another level deeper".
And we can imagine mathematical isomorphisms that "cut across the levels".
Because of these informal considerations, it v/ould be unwise to
attempt a general definition of mathematical isomorphism. It simply may
not be possible to anticipate all the forms that mathematical isomorphisms
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will take on.*
What tnen becomes of the hypothesis that mathematical notions are
notions preserved under all abstract isomorphisms? We are not in a
position to explain abstract isomorphisms as a genus which includes the
isomorphisms of all mathematical theories, for we have not been able to
say generally what mathematical isomorphisms are. However, there is
another account of abstract isoraorphis.m which may prove more fruitful:
Let us suppose that abstract isomorphisms are mappings which preserve not
merely the structure which is the concern of this or that mathematical
theory, but which preserve all mathematical structure.
Is such a view possible? Recall how we extended the weaker "func-
tion-relation isomorphisms to deal with the case of topology. Suppose we
iterate this process indefinitely. Perhaps we will obtain isomorphisms
which preserve total mathematical structure.
Simple isomorphisms of properties are defined over the instances of
those properties. Topological isomorphisms are defined over the in-
stances of properties and the members of those instances. Isomorphisms
which preserve total mathematical structure are defined over the closures
of objects:
D3 S is the closure of X =df
S is the union of the following inductively defined sets:
Sq = the set which has X as its sole member
S = the set consisting of
k+1
•Metric space isomorphisms, which are defined in the Notes of section





. , such that for some property
or relation R in S^, aj
(ii) all a^,..., a^, such that for some
function f in S f(a, a ) = a
I n n-r 1 ’
and
3^11 a such that for some set x in S a 6, x
k’
Notice that if X is a pure set, S is the so-called transitive closure of
X.
Let us define abstract isomorphisms as follows:
D4 i is an abstract isomorphism from X to Y =df i is a one-to-one
correspondence from the closure of X to the closure of Y such
that
(A) for any n-ary relation R in the domain of i, and objects
a^ , . .
.
,
a^ in the domain of i,
R[a a ] iff i(R)fi(a, i(a )]




V = Vl i(f)(i(a,) i(a_^)) =
(C) for any set x in the domain of i, and object a in the
domain of i,
a £ X iff i(a) £ i(x)
Clearly these isomorphisms are "abstract". They are defined entirely in
terms of logic and set theory. Notice that they preserve all the struc-
ture we can possibly describe in logical or set theoretic terms. If they
do not preserve total mathematical structure, I cannot imagine what
would.
We can define abstractly isomorphic in the obvious way:
D5 X and Y are abstractly isomorphic =df there is an abstract
isomorphism from X to Y




P3 If F is a property-notion of mathematics, then for any abstractlyisomorphic objects X and Y, X has F if and only if Y has F.
The notions of co-sequence, group, r-system, and topology all satisfy this
principle. (How these examples may be established is shown in the i.otes
of this section.)
P3 covers the property notions of mathematics. What about the more
complex relational and functional notions of mathematics? For example,
is there another principle which is satisfied by the notion of the iden-
tity element of a group?
Assuming the usual set theoretic construal of ordered n- tuples, we
might try the following:
P4a If R is an n-ary relational notion of mathematics, then for any
abstractly isomorphic n- tuples (X X ) and (Y Y ),
I n I n
xj iff r.[Yj
b If f is an n-ary functional notion of mathematics, then for any
abstractly isomorphic n+1 -tuples (X ,..., X
,
X and (Y
y Y In n"* 1 1
n ’ n+ r ’
f.(X X ) = X iff f.(Y ...., Y ) = Y
,,
1 n n-+-l I n n^1
The notion of the identity element of a group satisfies Pif. So too does
the topological notion of the boundary of a set. Indeed, I can think of




The view that mathematics is concerned v/ith abstract structure
reduces to these two principles, P3 and I believe that these two
principles are correct, and so believe that the general view is correct.
Koreover, P3 and P4 are very nearly definitive of mathematical
notions. Any notion which satisfies the conditions mentioned in those
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principles is extensionally equivalent to some mathematical notion.
Every mathematical predicate or function-phrase stands for a mathe-
matical notion. Thus the rejection of mathematical objects in chapter I
is a natural accompaniment of the present principles. For example, if we
had allov/ed "f" to stand for an operation among numbers, it would stand
for something which pertains only to numbers, and not to abstractly
isomorphic things--contrary to Pif. V/e may conclude that traditional
mathematical Platonism is incompatible with the newer "structuralism".
Notes
I have asserted that mathematical property-notions satisfy P3, and
that relational and functional mathematical notions satisfy P4. Direct
verification of cases is rather tedious. Fortunately, we shall later
have a theorem which renders such verification unnecessary, theorem T3 of
ch. II, s. 6. T3 tells us how to recognize abstract structural notions
from their very definitions . Thus, for example, a mere glance at the
group axioms is enough to assure us that the notion of a group satisfies
P3 . Nevertheless, the reader might appreciate at least one example of
direct verification. I shall therefore treat the case of groups in this
manner.
Let i be an abstract isomorphism from an object X to an object Y.
Suppose X is a group. By theorem t2 (from the Notes of ch. Ill, s. 2),
i(X) = y. Thus to verify that P3 holds of the group notion, we must show
that Y satisfies the group axioms.
Since i is an abstract isomorphism, we know that for any objects
a, b, and c in the domains of X,
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^ X(a, b) = c iff Y(i(a), i(b)) = i(c)
Suppose the domains of Y are not identical. Suppose, for example,
that an object a' is in the first domain of Y but not in its second do-
main. Then there are objects b’ and c' such that Y(a'
,
b') - c'. Since
i is a one-to-one correspondence from the closure of X to the closure of
Y, there are objects a, b, and c such that a' = i(a), b* = i(b), and
C = i(c). By U, X(a, b) = c. But since X is a binary operation, there
are objects d and e such that X(d, a) = e. By #, Y(i(d), a') r: i(e).
So a' is in the second domain of Y.-— a contradiction. A similar contra-
diction arises if the second domain of Y contains an object not in its
first domain. Thus the domains of Y must be identical.
Suppose the range of Y is not contained in its domains. Then there
is an object a' in the range which does not belong to the domains. Since
a' is in the range, there are objects b' and c' such that Y(b', c') = a'
.
Since i is a one-to-one correspondence, there are objects a, b, and c
such that a' = i(a), b' = i(b), and c' = i(c). By it, X(b, c) = a. But
since X is a binary operation, a is in the domains of X. That is, for
some d and e, X(a, d) = e. By H, Y(a', i(d)) = i(e), and a' is a member
of the domains of Y— a contradiction. Hence the domains of Y contain
its range.
Because the domains of Y are identical and contain the range, Y is
a binary operation. Y satisfies the first axiom of groups, Alg.
For any objects a, b, and c, X(a, X(b, c)) = X(X(a, b) , c), by the
associativity of the group X. Using several applications of H, it fol-
lows that for any objects a, b, and c in the domain of i, Y(i(a), Y(i(b),
i(c))) = Y(Y(i(a), i(b)), i(c)). But since every member of the domains
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of Y is the image of some object under i, we may conclude that for any
objects a', b’
,
and c' in the domains of Y, Y(a', Y(b'
,
c’)) = Y(Y(a'
b ), c ). That is, Y satisfies the Associative Axiom, A2g.
X has an identity element, 0: For any object a in the domains of
X, X(a, 0) := X(0, a) = a. By //, it follows that for any object a in the
domains of X, Y(i(a), i(0)) = Y(i(0), i(a)) = i(a). But since every
object in the domains of Y is the image under i of some object in the
domains of X, this implies that i(0) is an identity element for Y. Since
there obviously cannot be two identity elements, Y satisfies A3g.
Let a' be any object in the domains of Y. Since i is a one-to-one
correspondence, there is an object a such that i(a) = a', and a is in the
domains of X. Because X is a group, a has a unique inverse -a: X(a, -a)
= X(a, -a) = 0. By Y(a'
,
i(-a)) = Y(i(-a), a') = i(0), so i(-a) is an
inverse for a'. Thus every member of the domains of Y has an inverse.
Since inverses are necessarily unique, Y satisfies A4g. —This completes
the proof that Y is a group.
3. The Logicist Account of Mathematical Notions
The "structuralism" of principles P3 and P4 is not the only existing
account of mathematical notions. The logiciets have propounded another:*
LOG The notions of mathematics are definable from the basic notions
of logic.
This is in fact a very successful account of mathematical notions, and it
will be worth our while to compare it v/ith the structuralist view. But
*The view is stated in the Preface of Bertrand Bussell's Principles
of Mathematics (1903) and in the opening remarks of Rudolph Carnap's
"The Logicist Foundations of Mathematics" (1931)*
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fxrst we need a more complete understanding of the account itself.
In order to understand LOG, we obviously need to know what the basic
logical notions are. The logicists gave roughly the following list:*
BLN (1) Logical Connectives: &, v,




(5) Forms of Predication: P[a], Rfa, bj, sfa, b, cl,...
(6) Forms of Functional Application: f(a), g(a, b) , . . . **
The first two items on this list are a bit problematic. Assuming that
connectives are notions, they are neither clearly relational nor clearly
functional. However, I think that this will not cause us any difficulty.
The last two items on the list are most in need of explanation.
A form of predication is what we obtain from a proposition when all
its specialized constituents are replaced by veiriables. For example,
'Socrates is a man' yields the form of simple predication, Pfal, the
notion of an object possessing a property. This is of course a rela-
tional notion, since it corresponds to the relational predicate "object
possesses property ...". It is not a true relation, because it
transcends all the types of type theory, all the ranks of set theory.
'John loves Mary' has the form of binary relation, Pfa, bJ, the notion
of an object a bearing a relation R to an object b. This is a ternary
relational notion, since it corresponds to the ternary predicate "object
bears relation ... to object ". For any n, there is a form of
n-ary relation, and it is an n+l-ary relational notion. Note also that
*Compare this with the list of Russell, op. cit . , s. 1, and that of
Carnap, op. cit., s. I.
**I shall use all simple Roman letters as variables; underlined words
and letters, as constants. I understand variables to range over objects
of all types, so that there are no explicit type distinctions.
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the form of simple predication is for intensions, properties, what set
membership is for extensions, sets.*
A form of functional application is what we obtain from a functional
complex when all its specialized constituents are replaced by variables.*
For example, 'the mother of Meinong' has the form of simple application,
f(a), the notion of the result of applying a function f to an object a.
This is a functional notion, the one corresponding to the function-phrase
"the result of applying to For every n, there is a form of
n-ary application, and it is an n^i-ary functional notion.
Only the first three items on the list, connectives, quantifiers,
and identity, appear in eleraentary logic. Set membership, forms of predi
cation, and forms of functional application are nonelementary logical
notions. They belong to higher-order logic and set theory. The logi-
cists evidently believed that logic includes set theory and higher-order
logic
.
Some philosophers will say that only elementary logic is really
logic. As an objection to LOG, this misses the point. The boundairies
of logic are unclear. The important fact is that BLN happens to be a
pretty good basis on which to define mathematical notions.
LOG is a generalization: Every mathematical notion is definable
from BLN. This generalization has a large number of confirming in-
stances, many of which are exhibited in Principia Mathematica . From BLN,
*For a discussion of these forms, see Russell's Introduction to
Mathematical Philosophy
,
ch. XVIII, p. 198-9*
**In speaking of propositions and functional complexes, I do not wish
to commit myself to the view that these are something beyond sentences
and function-phrases.
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we may define each mathematical notion we have encountered in our discus.
Sion, for each was introduced in purely logical or set theoretic terms.
Thus we may define such simple notions as the domain of a function and
the transitivity of a relation, and we may define the more interestion







But a single disconfirming instance topples LOG, and I believe that
there is one.
Ob.jection to the Logicist Account
The simplest objection to LOG begins with the observation that the
basic logical notions, the members of the list BLN, are countable. If we
understand definition in the ordinary way, the notions definable from the
basic logical notions are also countable. Thus LOG entails that there
are only countably many mathe-matical notions. This restriction leads to
difficulty.
To see the difficulty clearly, we need some definitions. Some of









rJ *—* VaVb(RCa, b3 ~K[b, a]) &
VaVb(R[a, b]va = bvR[b, a]) &
VaVbVc(R[a, b] & R[b, c] -» R [a, c] ) &
Vx( Va(a £ X a €. field . (R) ) & 3a(a 6 x) ->
3a(a 6 X & -^Hb(b £ x & R[b, a})) )
d3 initial segment . £l, r]
3p(p £ field . (R) & VaVb(l£a, b3 Rfa, pi ^ rCb, pi b] )
)
These are definitions of notional constants in the object language.
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dk \/a(a £ domain
, (f) 3b(f(a) = b)) *
Va(a £ j^ange
. (f) <f-» 3b(f(b) = a))
d6 one-to-one. Tf 3 VaVb(f(a) = f(b) a = b)
<i7 one-to-one correnpondence. Cf
,
x. yj ^ domain, (f) . x S, ran.e.fn




These notions are fairly familiar, but their definitions do serve to
illustrate what can be constructed from BLN.
However, the most forceful statement of my objection requires no-
tions beyond the power of the loglcist systems. These Invoke the theory
of possible wotOds and possible objects. This is a departure from the
extenslonallst methods of previous sections, but perhaps in the end it
Will prove dispensible.
d8 A function f is a transworld function just in case for any
possible objects x and y, if it is possible that f(x) = y,then necessarily f(x) = y. ’
I call such functions ” transworld" because they do exactly the same thing
from world to world. Relying heavily on the theory of possible objects,
I shall suppose that contingently existing objects can appear in the
domains and ranges of such functions. One contingent object can be the
result of applying a transworld function to another even in worlds where
neither exists!
d9 A function f is a transworld isomorphism from a relation R
in a possible world w to a relation R' in a possible world w*
just in case (l) f is a transworld function, (2) f is a one-
to-one correspondence from the field of R in w to the field
of R' in w'
,
and (3) for any possible objects x and y,
yJ in w iff R'[fCx), f(y)3 in w'
*The k-th domain of an n-ary function f is the set of all objects a





f(b. Vi’ b .) =n-1
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For any such function f, the way in which objects are arranged by h in w
is exactly duplicated by the way in which their corresponding objects,
their images under f, are arranged by R' in w'
.
^ A relation R in a world w is isomorphic to a relation R ' i n a
world w* just in case there is an isomorphism from R in w to
R ' i n vv ’ .
Isomorphic relations are simply relations which arrange their fields in
exactly the same way.*
d 1 1 A well-ordering R ^ w is shorter than a well-ordering R ' in w'
just in case R in w is isomorphic to some initial segment of
R ' in w'
.
Shortness in well-orderings is just what one would expect it to be.
Indeed, we can prove the following theorem about it: For any well-
orderings R in V/ and R' in w', exactly one of the following holds: (i)
R in w is shorter than R' in v/'
,
(ii) R' in w' is shorter than R in w, or
(iii) R in w is isomorphic to R' in w'
.
dl2 A notion T is a relation type just in case there is a relation
R' and a possible world w' such that for every relation R and
world w, R satisfies T in w if and only if R in w is isomorphic
to R‘ in w'
.
This is similar to Bertrand Russell's definition of a relation number .**
But a relation number is a class of relations which are isomorphic in
the actual world . I am concerned with the corresponding notions, what-
ever they may be.
dl3 A notion T is a well-order type just in case T is a relation
type such that for any relation R and world w, if R satisfies
T in w, then R is a well-ordering in w.
Since every relation isomorphic to a well-ordering is itself a weli-
*They are also relations which share the same arrow diagram^ . See
Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World , s. 11.
** Principles of Mathematics , s.
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ordering, any relation type which is possessed by a well-ordering in some
world is a well-order type.
Certain well-order types can be defined frora the basic logical no-
tions. A trivial example is the well-order type of two-element well-
orderings :
^-well-ordering .rfi] >
3a3b(a / b & VcVd(RCc, dl <—» c = a & d = b))







. (R) 3b(RCa, b})) &
3aVb( VcCRfc, b] Bd(Rfc, d] R[d, b])) b = a )
(that is, R is an infinite well-ordering with a unique element
that is not the immediate successor of any other)
The relation among natural numbers is supposed to be an co-v/ell-
ordering. So is the relation
€
among the members of the Von Neumann set
theoretic ordinal co.
Since these well-order types can be defined from the basic logical
notions, they are the sort of notions LOG counts as mathematical. In so
far as it does this, LOG is correct. These well-order types are mathe-
matical notions. But I think we can assert a much stronger claim:
pi All well-order types, whether definable from the basic logical
notions or not, are mathematical notions.
This principle can be derived from the view that mathematics is concerned
with abstract structure. A well-order type is simply a notion v/hich is
necessarily satisfied only by relations exhibiting a peculiar abstract
relational structure. Thus it is an abstract structural notion. As an
independent basis for pi, I can only cite mathematical practice: Single
out a type of well-orderings, and it is bound to become a subject of
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mathematical study.*
The problem for LOG is that there is a well-order type v/hich is not
definable from the basic notions of logic, namely:
UnVOT The well-order type corresponding to the predicate "is a shortest
well-ordering not of a type definable from BLN".
To complete the objection, all we need show is that the noticn 'JV<1 1 is
indeed a well-order type.
The major premise is: Uncountable well-orderings are possible. --
This premise would be granted by most working mathematicians. Moreover,
anyone v/ho believes the axioms of set theory are possibly true is com-
mitted to it. This follows from the fact that the existence of an un-
countable ordinal,
,
is provable from the axioms of set theory.**
Let us therefore suppose that there is an uncountable well-ordering
R in a world w. Each object x in the field of H in w corresponds to a
unique initial segment of R in w, the restriction of R to the objects
which bear R to x. Since R is uncountable, it has uncountably many ini-
tial segments. No two of these are of the same well-order type (as can
be seen from the fact mentioned after dll). Since only countably many
notions can be defined from BLN, not every initial segment has a defin-
able well-order type. Since R is a well-ordering, there is a least x in
the field of R such that the corresponding initial segment is not of a
type definable from BLN. Let I be this initial segment. It is the
shortest initial segment of R which is not of a type definable from BLN.
•Probably it would be studied in set theory, studied by postulating
the existence of a pure set, an ordinal, which represents the type.
**)^ is the set of all countable ordinals. Its members are well-
ordered^ by the relation ^ restricted to that set.
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Let I’ be any relation which satisfies UWOT in a world w'
. That is,
it is In w' a shortest well-ordering not of a type definable from BLN.
Then I in w is not shorter than I' in w* —^otherwise it would be isomor-
phic to a definable initial segment of I' in w* and so be of a definable
type. Suppose on the other hand that I' in w' is shorter than I in w.
By the definition of shortness, I' in w' is isomorphic to an -nitial
segment of I in w. That initial segment is shorter than the whole, I in
w. By the selection of I
,
it must be of a definable type. But since
I' in w' is isomorphic to it, I' in w' is of the very same type, a type
definable from BLN. But this contradicts our original hypothesis. Hence
I* in w* is not shorter than I in w. Since both relations are well-
orderings in the respective worlds, and since neither is shorter than the
other, they are of equal lengths and isomorphic. —We have shown that if a
re tion satisfies UWOT in a world, then it is isomorphic to I in w.
Let I' in w' be isomorphic to I in w. Then I* in w' is not of a
type definable from BLN, since if it were, so would I in w be. Suppose
I" in w' is a well-ordering shorter than I' in w' . Since I* in w' is
isomorphic to I in w, I'* in w' is shorter than I in w. That is, it is
isomorphic to an initial segment of I in w. But since that initial
segment must be of a type definable from BLN, so too must I'* in w'.
Hence any well-ordering which is shorter than I' in w' is of a type
definable from BLN. That is, I' satisfies UWOT in w' . —Moreover , we have
shown that for any I* in w' which is isomorphic to I in w, I' satisfies
UWOT in w' .
Putting these results together, we have shown that UWOT is a well-
order type, the type satisfied by all relations I' and worlds w'
which
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are isomorphic to I in w. By pi, UWOT is a mathematical notion. How-
ever, it is obviously not definable from BLN, So LOG is false. There
are mathematical notions which cannot be defined from the basic notions
of logic.
It might be objected that I have construed "definition" too nar-
rowly. I have said that only countably many notions can be defined from
BLN. This is so if definitions are restricted, in the usual way, to
finite combinations of defining notions. But mightn't the logicists have
construed definition more broadly? Mightn't they have allowed defini-
tions by some form of infinite combination?
Ccirnap rules out the possibility by calling for "explicit defini-
tions". Russell is not quite so clear, although the Preface of Princi -
ples of Mathematics describes that work as an attempt to establish the
logicist position by "strict symbolic reasoning". The definitions that
can be given explicitly in symbols are all of the finite sort.
If the logicists did not mean to confine themselves to definitions
in the ordinary sense, they certainly omitted any explanation of a
broader sense of definition. They gave no rules for definition by
infinite combination. Rather than attribute such an omission to them,
it is better to suppose that they gave LOG a quite clear meaning. In
that case, however, the argument against LOG holds.
LOG has some attractive results. Many notions of mathematics are
definable from BLN. But others are not. What exactly went wrong?
LOG places a formalistic restriction on mathematical notions, the
finitude of definition. It is because of this restriction that LOG falls
prey to the argument above. Maybe one of the ideas behind LOG is
right.
namely that mathematical notions are in some way dependent on the basic
notions of logic. Maybe LOG goes wrong only becuase it identifies the
dependence as explicit definition.
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Notes
A similar objection to logicism appears in John L. Pollock's article
"On Logicism". Pollock believes his objection is entirely decisive. In
what follows, I hope to show that a fairly simple modification of iogi-
cism survives the attack.
The argument of this section does not undermine variants of logicism
which include all ordinals, or all pure sets, among the basic logical
notions. My argument is aimed only at "reductive" identifications of
mathematics and logic. These extravagant variants are evidently not
reductive.
3. Overcoming the Limitations of Definition
Mathematical notions are not just those which may be defined from
the basic logical notions. However, there is another way in which they
might depend on them.
Before proceeding, it is convenient to recall a distinction: Among
the basic notions of logic, some are elementary . These include the con-
nectives, the quantifiers, and identity. Set membership, forms of predi-
cation, and forme of functional application are nonelementary logical
notions. They appear only in the higher forms of logic and in set the-
ory.
V/ith this distinction, we may restate logicist thesis LOG:
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LOG' The notions of mathematics are definable from the nonelementary
logical notions using the elementary logical notions.
That is, let us now imagine that noneleraentary logical notions are the
material" from which logicist definitions are made, and that definition
proceeds within the "framework" of elementary logical notions. Concen-
trating on the "material" will simplify matters for us. If we were to
attend to the "framework", we would have to ascertain the "se.mantic
categories" of the elementary logical notions. In the case of quanti-
fiers and connectives, that would not be easy.
The nonelementary logical notions impose an order on the objects of
any possible world. For certain pairs of possible worlds, these orders
axe exactly resembling, or isomorphic . This happens just when there is a
one-to-one correspondence between objects in the first world and objects
in the second world such that objects in the first world are related in
a certain way by the nonelementary logical notions if and only if their
correspondents in the second world are also so related by those notions.
These correspondences are isomorphisms with respect to the nonelementary
logical notions. They are functions which may be said to preserve the
nonelementary logical notions.
They are also functions which preserve all notions definable from
the nonelementary logical notions. That is, for any such isomorphism i
between worlds u and v, and any notion L definable from the nonelementary
notions of logic, an object x satisfies L in u if and only if i(x) satis-
fies L in V. Moreover, if we define a derivative of the nonelementary
logical notions to be any notion which is preserved under all such iso-
morphisms, then v/e obtain a sense of dependence which is broader than
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definition. That is, everything which can be defined from the nonele-
mentary logical notions is a derivative of them, but there are deriva-
tives of the nonelementary logical notions which cannot be so defined.
The isomorphisms we need are isomorphisms with respect to some given
set of objects S. And for our purposes, they must be transworld func-
tions :
D6 i is an S-isomorphism from a world w to a world w* just in
case (1) i is a transworld function, (2) i is a one-to-one




(i) for every n-ary relation R that belongs to S
in w, and all a, , . .
.
,
a in the domain of i,
I n
Rfa,,..., a 1 in w iff Rfi(a ),..., i(a )] in w’in In
(ii) for every n-ary function g that belongs to S in
w, and all a,,..., a
,
a in the domain of i,
1 n n+1
g(a,,..., a ) = a , , in w iff g(i(a, ),..., i(a )) = i(a in w'
I n n+1 1 n n+1
(that is, i is a transworld function which preserves the things in S)
Derivative relations and functions can be defined in accordance with my
informal remarks:
D7 An n-ary relation R is a derivative of the things in S just in
case for any S-isomorphism i from a world v/ to a v/orld w' , and




R[a, a ] in w iff R[i(a, ),..., i(a )] in w»
I n I n
(that is, R is preserved under any isomorphism which preserves
the objects in S)
D8 An n-ary function g is a derivative of the things in S just in
case for any S-isomorphisra i from a world w to a world w' , and




g(a^,..., a^) = a^^^ in w iff g(i(a^),...,
(that is, g is preserved under any isomorphism which preserves
the notions in S)
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It follows trivially from these definitions that a function or relation
which is a member of a set of objects is a derivative of those objects.
There is a more interesting consequence:
T1 Anything which is definable from a set of relations and functions,
using the elementary notions of logic, is a derivative of them.
This theorem says that derivatives include definables. It is proved in
the Notes of this section.
T1 suggests a modification of the logicist account of mathematical
notions, LOG. That view was based on the idea of definition and was
found to be too narrow. Perhaps an account based on the idea of deriva-
tive relations and functions would not have that defect:
LOG+ The notions of mathematics are derivatives of the nonelementary
notions of logic.
Notice that the step from LOG to LOG+ can be imitated in other contexts,
since the definitions D6, D7, and D8 are completely general.*
Unfortunately, there is some difficulty involved in applying the
definitions to the set of nonelementary logical notions. The definitions
refer explicitly to functions and relations of the given set S, not to
relational and functional notions. The problem is that v/e probably do
not want to count the nonelementary notions of logic among relations and
functions. To do so would invite contradiction.
For example, suppose the form of simple predication, PfaJ , is a
*Indeed, the idea behind the step from LOG to LOG+ was borrowed from
remarks on geometry by Hermann Weyl: *'A point relation is said to be
objective if it is invariant with respect to every automorphism," and
"... an automorphism is a one-to-one mapping p p’ of the point field
onto itself which leaves the basic relations undisturbed..." ( Philosopher
of Mathematics and Natural Science , p. 72-3)- Weyl’s remarks belong to
a tradition established by Klein's Erlanger Program (see footnote, p. W
of the present discussion).
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relation. V/e may deduce from this the existence of a property SqCpCqJ]
,
the property of having an instance. Then we may deduce that there is a
property 3 qCpCq33 & '^PfPj
,
the property of having an instance but not
being an instance of itself. Call this property "H"
. Then from the fact
that there are properties v/hich have instances but are not instances of
themselves, we may deduce a contradiction: HCHJ <—t ~HCH]
.
For this reason, it seems best to suppose that the nonelementary
logical notions are not relations and functions. They are of course like
relations and functions, they are relational functional notions. But
speaking strictly, D6 does not apply to them.
Probably this difficulty can be surmounted. Probably definitions
can be constructed that apply even in the case of nonelementary logical
notions. I shall not try to do so, however, since I shall be defending a
principle stronger than LOG+, Nevertheless, it is good to see how LOG+
would avoid the problems of LOG, were better definitions constructed.
The objection to LOG began with the observation that only countably
many notions can be defined from the basic logical notions. Hence the
objection does not even get off the ground against LOG+. It cannot be
shown that only countably many notions are derivatives of the nonelemen-
tary logical notions.
Moreover, the well-order type which gave LOG trouble, UWOT, is no
problem for LOG+. Although it is not definable from the basic logical
notions, it is a derivative of them: For suppose it were not. Then
there would be an isomorphism v/ith respect to the nonelementary logical
notions, i, between worlds w and w' , and relations R and R* such that i
maps R to R', but R satisfies UWOT in w, and R* does not satisfy UWOT
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in w'. Hov/ever, notice that this isomorphism would contain as a part an
isomorphism of relations from R in w to R' in v/'
. Hence R and P.' are of
the same well-order type--a contradiction. Therefore, the well-order
type UWOT is a derivative of the nonelementary notions of logic, and it
may qualify as a mathematical notion according to LOG+.
LOG placed a formalistic restriction on the notions of mathematics.
LOG+
,
assuming that it can be patched up, removes this restriction.
Moreover, LOG+ inherits all the virtues of LOG, since, by T1
,
every
notion which qualifies as mathematical according to LOG also qualifies
according to LOG+. In particular, every mathematical notion defined in






I shall make use of a well-known theorem concerning
isomorphic interpretations of first-order languages.* In order to do
this, I need some definitions:
d15 Ij^ the w-relativized interpretation of an interpreted language L ,
is a function defined on the constants and primitives of L such that
(i) for any constant A, I (A) is the object A denotes,
1j ) w




such that for any possible objects a^ , . . . , a^,
I, (7T)fa,,..., a ] iff Rfa ,..., a 1 in w,
L
,
w 1 n I n
where R is the relation 7T denotes, and
*I shall use a stylistic variant of Proposition 2.33 in Elliott
Kendelson's Introduction to Mathematical Logic..
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(iii) for any primitive n-ary function symbol 2T, i (-y) aL
,
w
function such that for any possible objects a^
"" Vl a^)
where f is the function 3” denotes.
» • • • 1 a f a ,
n’ n+r
= a in V/
n+1
is a jL-relativized assignment for L =df f is a function defined
on the constants, primitives, variables, and complex terms of L
such that
(i) for any constant or primitive ^ of L, f(X) = I {'X)
L,w ’
(ii) for any variable of L, f(')^) is some object existing in w,








The notion of being definable from a set of functions and relations oc-
curs in Tl
. This must be defined for both functions and relations:
dl7 A formula f of a language L defines an n-ary relation R in terms
of S =df 9 is a formula of L such that
(i) every nonlogical primitive of 9 denotes a member of S,





(iii) for any possible world w and possible objects a^ , . .
. ,
a^,
Rfa^,..., a^] in w iff for every v/-relativized assignment f
of L, if f(J^^) = a^,..., fOi^) = a^,
then f satisfies 9
dl8 A term Z of a language L defines an n-ary function g in terms
of S =df T is a term of L such that
(i) every nonlogical primitive of Z denotes a member of S,
(ii) Z has n free variables and there is a variable
^n+1
of L which is distinct from these, and
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s(s,>»«»j a ) = a
1 n
in w Iff for every w-relativized assignment f





Obviously, a function or relation is definable from a set S of functions
and relations just in case there is a terra or formula in some language
which defines it in terms of S.
T1 Anything wliich is definable from a set S of functions and relations
is a derivative of them.
I shall prove this for relations only. The case of functions may be
proved similarly.
Proof: Suppose K is a k-ary relation definable from S. Let L be a lan-
guage whose only nonlogical primitives are those used in the definition
? of K. Let i be an arbitrary S-isomorphism from w to w* .






this, recall that i is an S-isomorphism:
a^J in w iff R[i(a^ ),..., i(a^)j in w'
f(a,..., a ) =a
,,
inw iff f(i(a,),..., i(a )) =i(a^,) inw'
I n n^ 1 I n n+1
for all integers n, and all H and f in S. Therefore,
('^)ra,,..., a 3 iff I ,(V)[l(a ),..., i(a )J





(3')(a ,..., a ) = a iff
,
(^) (i(a ) , . .
.
,
i(a )) = i(a )
L
,
w 1 n n+1 L w * 1 n n+1
for any integer n, and primitives 7T and 2T of L. But given that L has no
constants, these latter equivalences just say that I. and I are
Ij
^




For any w-relativized assignment f of L, define a corresnondinfr
assignment to be any w'
-relativized assignment f such that for every
variable of L, f'O^) = i(f(7^)).
The theorem concerning isomorphic interpretations tells us that if f
is a w-relativized assignment for L, and f is a corresponding assignment,
then
1 f satisfies T iff f satisfies 9
Since T defines K, we also have:
Kfa^,..., a^l in w iff for every w-relativized assignment f





!!! Kfi(a^ i(a^)] in w' iff for every w* -relativized assignment f
of L, if = i(a^),..., =
i(a ), then f satisfies ^
where » • • • > the free variables of 9.
Suppose it is not the case that K[i(a^ i(a^)l in w' . Then for




but f ' does not satisfy 9. Let f be a w-relativized assignment of
L such that for every variable f(?^) is the inverse image of
under i (the object a such that i(a) = f'CT^)). Then f is a corres-
ponding assignment for f . By ! , f itself does not satisfy 9 • Sut by
definition of f, , . . .
,
= a^. So by ! 1
,
it is not the
case that Kfa^ , . . .
,
in w.—Thus if K (a^ , . . .
,






Suppose it is not the case that K^a^ , . . .
,
a^] in w. Then for some
w-relativized assignment f of L, = a^ , . . . , ^
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not satisfy f. Let f be a W-relatlvized assignment for L such that for
any variable f.()[) = i(f(^,). men f is a corresponding assignment
for f. By !, f» does not satisfy*?. But f'(^^) = i(a^
)
=
i(a^). So by !!!, it is not the case that K[i(a^ i(a^^)] in w'.—











a^^ in the domain of i,
K[a^,..., a^] in w iff K[i(a^),..., i(a^)] in w'
Since we have shown this for an arbitrary S-isomorphism i, K is a deriva-
tive of the functions and relations in S. Q.E.D.
Notice that the proof depends on the fact that the members of S are
relation-like and function-like, not on the stronger fact that they are
true relations and true functions. Hence the proof is easily extended to
the case in which S is the set of nonelementary logical notions.
6« A Compoirison of Logicism and Structuralism
Although the modified logicist account LOG+ has not been formulated
in a completely precise way, v/e need not shy away from all comparison
with the structuralist view underlying P3 and Pif. We are in a position
to uncover some important relationships.
The major obstacle to a direct comparison is the fact that logicism
has been formulated in intensional terms, while structuralism has been
formulated in extensional terms. We can remove the obstacle by giving
the intensional counterparts of the structuralist principles, ?3 and P/f.*
•Could we effect a comparison by giving an extensional version of
LOG+? This would not be interesting: There are too few isonorphisms-
with-respect-to-tho-nonelementary-logical-notions from this v/orld to
itself.
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This involves defining an intensional version of the fundamental struc-
turalist notion, abstract isomorphism :
D4' i is a transworld abstract isomorphism from X in w to Y in v
=df (1) i is a transworld function, (2) i is a one-to-one
correspondence from the closure of X in w to the closure of Y
in V, and (3) the follov/ing conditions are satisfied:
(A) for any n-ary relation R in the domain of i, and objects
a a in the domain of i,
1 n ’
RCa a 1 in w iff i(R)[i(a, ) , . . . , i(a )] in v
' In
(B) for any n-ary function f in the domain of i, and objects
a a
,
a in the domain of i,
I n n+
1
f(a a ) = a in w iff i( f ) (i(a, ) , . . . , i(a )) = i(a ,) in v
I n n^ I I n n'‘ 1
(C) for any set x in the domain of i, and object a in the
domain of i,
a £ X in w iff i(a) £ i(x) in v
Using this notion of abstract isomorphism, it is easy to reformulate P3
and P4:
P3' If F is a property notion of mathematics, and X in w is abstactly
isomorphic to Y in v, then X has F in w if and only if Y has F
in V.
P4'a If R is an n-ary relational notion of mathematics, and (X^,...,
X ) in v; is abstractly isomorphic to (Y,,..., Y ) in v, then
n In
R.fx, , . .
. ,
X J in w iff R.[y, , . . . , Y ] in v
^ 1 n I n
b If f is an n-ary functional notion of mathematics, and (X^,...,
X
,
in w is abstractly isomorphic to (Y^,..., Y^, in
V, then
in Vf-«, x^) = in w iff f.CY...... Y^) = Y^^,
LOG+ says that the notions of mathematics are derivatives of logical
notions, are preserved under isomorphisms with respect to those logical
notions. P3'-P4' says that the notions of mathematics are abstract
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structural notions, are preserved under abstract isonorphism. A close
link between these views can be revealed through another definition:
D9 i is an S-isomorphism from a set x in a world w to a set y in aworld w' just in case (1 ) i is a transworld function, (2) i is
a one-to-one correspondence from x in w to y in w*, and
(i) for every n-ary relation R from S in w, and all
> • • • > the domain of i,
a 3 in w iff Rfi(a i(a )] in W
“ I n
(ii) for every n-ary function g from S in w, and all






in w iff g(i(a,),..., i(a )) = i(i
n+1
) in w'
(that is, i is a transv/orld function which preserves the structure
imposed on x by the things in S)
This is simply the restriction of S-isomorphism (D6) to a set x. Looking
carefully at conditions (A), (B), and (C) of D/f'
,
we can see that these
state that the nonelementary logicail notions are preserved, in a re-
stricted v/ay, by abstract isomorphisms. In fact, we may observe that:
p2 An abstract isomorphism from X to Y is merely an isomorphism-with-
respect-to-the-nonelementary-logical-notions from the closure of X
to the closure of Y.
Thus the difference between L0G+ and P3*-P4' amounts to tliis: L0G+ says
that mathematical notions are preserved under global isonorphism v/ith
respect to the nonelementary logical notions. P3'-P4* says that mathe-
matical notions are preserved under certain restricted isomorphisms with
respect to the nonelementary logical notions.
From a superficial philosophical viewpoint, there is little to
choose between structuralism and modified logicism. According to both
views, mathematics is concerned with structure generated by logical, or
set theoretic, notions.
8i
What is the precise relationship between LOG+ and P3'-P4'? Let us
observe that:
p3 For any isomorphism-with-respect-to-the-nonelementary-logical-
notions i from a world w to a world w*
,
and any object X in the
domain of i, i contains as a part an abstract isomorphism from
X in w to i(X) in w’
.
A fairly simple consequence is:
T2 Every abstract structural notion (every notion which is preserved,
in the sense of ?3'-P4', under abstract isomorphisms) is a deri-
vative of the nonelementary notions of logic.
A proof is offered in the Notes of this section. T2 tells us that P3'
and PZf' Jointly entail LOG+. That is, structuralism contains the germ of
truth in logicism.
However, we cannot prove the converse of T2. Some notions which
qualify as mathematical according to LOG+ may not be mathematical ac-
cording to P3’-P4'. Indeed, we cannot even assert the counterpart of T1
.
There may be notions definable from the nonelementary notions of logic




This seems to put P3’-P4* in a precarious situation. LOG+ is
supported by the vast number of mathematical definitions which have
been constructed out of the basic notions of logic. P3'-P4* does not
directly inherit that support. Indeed, we have not eliminated the pos-
sibility that some mathematical definition provides a notion that vio-
lates P3' -P4'
•
It can be proven that definitions of certain special kinds do de-
fine notions that conform to P3'-P4*> Oue such kind is that of closur_e_2.
restricted definitions:
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Dio A closure restricted definition is a definition expressed by a
sentence of one of tv/o forms:
( 1 ) Tij ^ 9'
(2) ^ cp.
v/here 9' is obtained from a formula 9 ty restricting bound
variables with the formula ' £ closure
. ) v . . . V t
closure.
,
and T is a formula which (i) is constituted
solely of variables and items definable from the list BL:I, and
(ii) has only variables free.
Many mathematical definitions are trivially equivalent to closure-re-
stricted definitions. An example is the definition of a semigroup:
dl4 semigroup
.
fol Vx(3y3z(o(x, y) = z) 3y3z(o(y, x) = z)) &
Vx(Jy3z(o(y, z) = x) —» 3y3z(o(x, y) = z)) &
VxVyVz(o(o(x, y), z) = o(x, o(y, z)))
(that is, a semigroup is an associative binary operation)
This is clearly equivalent to a closure-restricted definition, since
every bound variable in the definiens is confined to the domains and
ranges of o. Similarly, the definitions of groups. Boolean algebras,
fields, rings, vector spaces, and partial orderings are aill equivalent to
closure-restricted definitions.
However, other definitions are not equivalent to closure-restricted
definitions. The definition of v/ell-orderings (d2) is an example. It
contains the following clause:
\/x( Va(a £ X a £ field . (R) ) & 3a(a 6 x) ->
3a(a £ X 8t -^BbCb £ x & R(b, a)) )
Here the variable "x" cannot be confined to the closure of R. "x” must
range over subsets of the field of R, and the closure of R need not
contain those.
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The same problem is encountered in definitions of a)-sequences, r-
systems, and topologies. In each case, there is a variable over sets
that need not appear in the closures of the relations or operations
involved.
Nevertheless, these set variables are confined to sets founded
_on
the closures of the objects involved. For example, the set variable in
the definition of well-orderings ranges over subsets of the field of the
given relation. Since the relation's field is part of its closure, sub-
sets of the field are indeed founded on the closure. The notion of an
object being founded on another set of objects can be precisely defined:
Kll founded on .CX, Yj VA(A 6 closure
.
(X) & -^3B(B e. A)
A €. closure . (Y)
)
Using this, v/e can define another kind of definition:
Dl 2 A closure- foundation definition is ...
(Same definition as D9, except that restriction is via formulas
of the form ' founded on . (^, closure . ) U closure .
U
...




The definitions of v/ell-orderings
,
W-sequences, r-systems, and topologies
are equivalent to closure-foundation definitions. Indeed, I can thinly of
no mathematical definition which is not so equivalent. I therefore ad-
vance the hypothesis:
HI Every definition of a mathematical notion from the basic notions
of logic is equivalent to some closure- foundation definition.
In viev/ of the vast number of mathematical definitions which can be given
in terms of the basic logical notions, HI supports P3'-P4' if we can
prove:
T3 Every closure-foundation definition defines a notion which
qualifies as mathenatical by P3'-Pi+».
I offer a proof of this tneoresi in the Notes of tiiis section.
T3 is a surprising result. Whether or not a notion neeting the
conditions of P3'-Pif' is satisfied by objects depends solely on how their
closiires are arranged by the nonelementary logical notions. But closure-
foundation definitions can contain quantifiers ranging over things out-
side of the closures of the objects to v;hich the defined notion applies.
V/hy can't such definitions be used to define notions which do not conform
to P3'-P4', which are not preserved under all abstract isomorphisms?
The answer lies in the "well-roundedness" of the universe of sets:
Select any two sets, X and Y, such that (l) they are of the same cardi-
nality, and (2) their members are all non-sets. Then the sets founded on
X are exactly like the sets founded on Y. —That is, they are ordered in
the same v/ay by the membership relation.
It follows that if tv/o objects sire abstractly isomorphic, then the
things founded on their closures also exhibit a common structure. The
proof of T3 is not far away.
Let me summarize: The intensional version of structuralism is a
stronger view than modified logicism, LOG+. But logicism is supported by
the fact that many mathematical definitions have been framed in terms of
the basic notions of logic. Is there any reason to believe that the
notions so defined conform to the structuralist principles? There is no
general assurance that definitions in terms of logical notions v/ill sat-
isfy those principles. Yet v/e have found one liind of logical definition
which alv/ays yields structural notions, closure-foundation definitions.
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If all logical definitions of mathematical notions are equivalent to
closure- foundation definitions, as I have hypothesized, then the notions
defined do conform to the structuralist principles.
There are marked similarities between structuralism and logicism.
Logicism is really concerned with structure imposed by the nonelementary
notions of logic. Structuralism is also concerned with such structure,
but only within a limited context, the closure of an object.
Notes
Proving T2 is a fairly simple matter. I shall do the case of rela-
tional structural notions.
T2 Every abstract structural notion is a derivative of the nonele-
mentary notions of logic.
Proof ; Suppose K is a k-ary relational abstract structural notion. Let
i be an isomorphism with respect to the nonelementary logical notions
from a world w to a world w' . Let a^ , . .
.
,
objects of w. Then
the restriction of i to the closure of (a ,..., a ) in w is an abstract
1 xC
isomorphism from (a^,..., a^) in w to (i(a^ ),..., i(a^)) in w' . (Here
I assume t2, which is introduced in the Notes of ch. Ill, s. 2.) Thus
SL^J in w if and only if K, Ci(a^ ) , . .
.
,
i(a^)3 in w' . Since we
have shown this for arbitrary i and a^ , . .
.
,
a^, K is a derivative of the
nonelementary logical notions. Q.E.D.
The proof of T3 follows the same pattern as T1 , but we need more
restricted notions of interpretation and assignment:
dl9 I
,




is a function defined on the constants and primitives
of L such that
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V/
(1) for any constant A, object A denotes,












’ Pfa^] 8c ... 8c Pfa^l ScRfa^,..., a^3 in
where R is the relation 7T denotes, and




function such that for any possible objects a ,..., a a
1 n n+1
’
V = Vl *- «
V = Vl “ *
v/here f is the function T denotes.
d20 f is a w,P-relativized aesit^nment for L =df f is a function
defined on the constants, primitives, and variables of L such
that
(i) for any constant or primitive X of L, fCX) = r>(X)»L,w,P
(ii) for any variable of L, f(>j^) is some object which has P
in w, and
(iii) for any complex term ^3'(f^,..., of L,
f(^x(r ,..., rj^) = f(?-)(f(r^) , . .
.
,
I prove T3 for the case of relational notions:
T3 Every closure-foundation definition defines a notion which
qUoLlifies as mathematical according to P3'-P^'.
Proof : Suppose K is a k-ary relational notion. Suppose 9 is a definiens
of a closure-foundation definition for K. Let L be a language v/hose only
nonlogical primitives are those used in 9- Lst i arbitrary ab-
stract isomorphism from (a^,..., a^) in w to (i(a^ ),..., i(a^)) in w'
.
(Again, I assume t2, which appears in the Notes of ch. Ill, s. 2.)
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Since T defines K, v/e have:
KCa^,..., a^l in w iff for every w-relativized assignment













, 7^^ are the free variables of?. But since ? is a formula
of a closure-foundation definition, the right side of the above equiva-
lence may be exchanged for that of the equivalence below:
Kfa^,..., a^3 in w iff for every w,P-relativized assignment
f of L, if f(^.) n a^,..., f(^^^) .
a^, then f satisfies ^
where P is the property of being founded on the union of the closures of
i(a^)3 in w' iff for every w' ,P'
-relativized assignment
f of L, if f'(^^) = i(a^),..., fCj^)
= then f satisfies f
where P' is the property of being founded on the union of the closures of
i(a^ i(a^). Furthermore,
^
and p, are isomorphic inter-
pretations. The isomorphism is the 6-extension of i, i^. Hence for any




f satisfies ? iff f satisfies ?
By the sort of reasoning contained in the proof of T1
,
we may deduce:
Kfa^,..., a^3 in w iff K[i(a^ ),..., "f*




Zv The Universality of MathepatlcR
i-Iathematics is the study of abstract structure, or so the foregoing
discussion indicates. Hov/ever, this fact does not by itself imply that
mathematics has a special place among the sciences. We can just as well
say that biology is concerned with biological structure, or that physics
is concerned with physical structure. What then is so special about
abstract structure?
Structure, as we presently understand it, is relative. Different
notions impose different kinds of structure, and these different kinds of
structure are preserved under different sorts of isomorphism ( vide D9)
.
It happens that mathematical structure is structure imposed by the non-
elementary logical notions and preserved under isomorphisms v;ith respect
to them. Thus if there is something special about abstract structure,
this something must be manifested by those very notions.
In v;hat sense are the nonelementary notions of logic special? It
will not do to say that they are notions of logic and ipso facto special.
On the one hand, the boundciries of logic are unclear. Indeed, they are
unclear at the very point at v;hich nonelementary notions are admitted.
Some v;ould not count these notions as logical ones. On the other hand,
it must be explained why logic is so special. This cannot be taken for
granted.
Perhaps the distinguishing feature of the nonelementary logical
notions is their universality . Recall again what they are: set member-
shin, forms of predication, and forms of functional application. These
notions aire jointly indispensable . V/e cannot make an ordinary statement
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without employing one of them. If we predicate one thing of others, vie
employ a form of predication. If we say one tiling is the such-and-such
of others, we employ a form of functional application. If we say one
thing belongs to a certain set of things, we employ the notion of set
membership. Thus every statement of every empirical science employs a
nonelementary logical notion.*
Of course, a set of jointly indispensable notions can contain ir-
relevant items. If the nonelementary logical notions are jointly indis-
pensable, so are those notions plus the property of being red—Every
statement of every empirical science employs some nonolomentary logical
notion or the property of being red. Do vie have any reaison to believe
that the list of nonelementary logical notions contains no irrelevant
items?
I think v;e do have a reason: The nonelementary logical notions are
intersubstitutable in practice . For all scientific purposes, we could
use forms of predication exclusively, ignoring set membership and forms
of functional application. Our scientific statements would be expressed
in terms of properties and relations, rather than sets or functions.
Likev/ise, we could work solely v/ith functions; or even solely with sets,
although the extensionality of sets may make this alternative philosophi-
cally unpalatable. The main point is that there is no simple practical
consideration indicating that one noneleraentary logical notion is somehow
less fundamental than the others. The list of nonelementary logical
Bare identities, 'a = b* , do not employ the nonelementary logical
notions. Nor do certain extraordinary statements, such as philosophical
assertions about those notions.
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notions contains no irrelevant items.
The nonelementary logical notions are universal in the sense that
they are both jointly indispensable and intersubstitutable in practice.
Because they are indispensable, they span the sciences. Because they are
intersubstitutable, each can contain nothing that is special to any one
science. Mathematics is the study of structure imposed by such universal
notions.
Mathematical notions, which are derivatives of the nonelementary
logical notions, inherit some of their generality. They too crop up in
quite diverse sciences. In virtue of this fact, mathematical insights
can be transferred freely from one realm of study to another.
Mathematics anticipates the sciences. V/e can devise raathe.:.atical
theories that have no known applications. All we need do is produce set
theoretic postulates describing all systems of a certain sort. We can
work out the consequences of such postulates even if no such systems are
known to us. And because of the abstract nature of the postulates, there
may be no good way to tell where, among all the sciences, such a system
might finally appear.
In this spirit, Hermann V/eyl has described mathematical postulate
sets as ’’logical molds for possible sciences”.* A mathematical postulate
set is an abstract structural description of systems. Such systems may
or may not be given to us by empirical science.
Is universality an essential feature of the nonelementary logical
notions? Certainly it is difficult to imagine a science devoid of these
*Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science , p. 25-
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notions. Ho» could we make statements without employing predication,
functional application, or set membership? What forms of language would
we use? There are no immediate answers.
From another point of view, it seems quite possible. The nonelemen-
tary logical notions are subject to laws, the laws of higher-order logic
and set theory. I think we can imagine tossing all the laws aside in
,
favor of new ones. But that would be tantamount to the acceptance of new
I
universal notions.
For example, predication is not mere concatenation of symbols. It
is a notion we take to satisfy certain laws. We can imagine a language
in which concatenation corresponds to a notion satisfying entirely dif-
ferent laws. Once we accept a scientific theory expressed in terms of
I
such a language, predication is no longer a universal notion.
I
It is perhaps an accident of history that the logicist's nonelemen-
tary logical notions are indeed universal. Likev/ise, it may be acciden-
tal that mathematics is the study of abstract structure, in the sense of
,
F3-P4> and that mathematical notions are derivatives of the nonelementary
logical notions, LOG+. The true definition of mathematics seems to be:
Mathematics is the study of structure imposed by universal notions,
J
whatever they happen to be.
! This definition allows for the possibility that set theory and
I
higher-order logic be replaced by the nev/er category theory. I am not
J
suggesting that this replacement will or should come about. I do not
- think the relative merits of these background theories are v/ell under-
j|
stood. Nevertheless, it is good to have a characterization of mathe-
j
rnatics that can survive changes in the background theory.
CHAPTER III
CLASSICAL FOUI'TDATIONS
1 . The General Laws of Sets
Set theory has been used to serve three foundational purposes.
First, it has been used to specify the systems of mathematical theories.
The axiomatic descriptions of well-orderings, w-sequences
,
and r-systems
contain quantifiers ranging over sets. These systems cannot be specified
v/ithout using something very much like set theory. Second, set theory
has been used to pursue higher-order development of mathematicail theo-
ries. Mathematicians are not interested merely in the roles of individ-
uals in the systems described by their mathematical theories. They are
interested in subsystems and in functions from one system to another.
For example, the elementary consequences of the group theory axioms are
fairly trivial. Only in theorems about subgroups and group horaomorphisms
does group theory assume its characteristic richness. Set theory is the
measure by v/hich we determine what subsystems and transformations there
are. Third, it has been used to provide mathematical objects, objects
for such theories as arltlunetic and the theory of real numbers.
Of these purposes, the third is superfluous. As I have pointed out
in my first chapter, there is no need for mathematical objects. Arithme-
tic is better interpreted as a theory about all co-sequences than as a
theory about special objects, numbers. Similarly, the tneory of real
numbers is better interpreted as a theory about all r-systems than as a
theory of a particular r-system of real numbers. And in general, a
92
mathematical theory is about ^ systems of a certain sort, not abou
some peculiar system of pure mathematical objects.
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The two legitimate purposes of set theory can be fulfilled without
categorical assertions of existence. In particular, there need not be
an axiom asserting the existence of an infinite set.
The sets used to specify the systems of a mathematical theory are
sets founded on those systems. Hence they are sets which exist if the
systems exist. Their existence need not be asserted categorically.
Subsystems and transformations of systems are also objects founded
on the systems themselves. They too exist i^ the systems exist, and
their existence need not be asserted categorically.
Thus the two legitimate purposes of set theory are served by those
general laws of sets v/hich tell us what sets exist given the existence of
certain other things. These include the Power Set Axiom:
Als Vx( set
.
Cx] 3 yC set .Ty] & Vz(z £ y set . [z2 8c
Vw(w 6. z w € x) ) )
)
This says that for any set, there is a set of all its subsets. Obvi-
ously some such axiom is needed in the higher-order development of mathe-
matical theories. Another important basic law is the Union Axiom:
A2s VxC set . [xl —* 3y( set .Cy3 &e Vz(z ^ y *—^ 3w(w £. x & z €. w))))
This allows us to combine arbitrarily many sets. Finally, we also need
the Replacement Schema:
A3s Vu(set.Cu3 8c Vs(s £ u -» 3rVt(9 t = r))S y V
3v(set. [v] 8c Vt(t £ V 3s(s€. u &
This says that for any set u and functional formula there is a set
V v/hich is the "range'* of ^ on u. The Replacement Schema "rounds out
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the universe of sets. Nearly as useful, however, is the weaker Separa-
tion Schema:
A3s' VxC^.Cx] 3y(set.fy] & \/z(z
€.y <-+zdx&T)))
z
TMs says that for any set x and formula ?, there is a subset of x con-
sistxng of just those things in x which satisfy 9. It tells us something
about the "richness” of sets. The subsets of a set x are at least as
rich as the forraulable distinctions among members of x.
Of course, sets also satisfy the Extensionality Axiom:
A4s VxVy(set.fx] & £et.[y] & \/z(z
€x^ z£y)->x = y)
And they are generally taken to satisfy the Regularity Axiom:
A5S Vx(^.Cx] & 3y(y £ x) 3y(y £ x & Vz(z £ x — z y)))
Notice that I have formulated the axioms in such a way that they
apply to impure sets, sets founded on nonsets. This is a desirable fea-
ture. The systems treated by mathematical theories include systems dis-
covered by empirical science. Mathematical descriptions of those empir-
ical systems contain references to sets founded upon them, sets v’hich are
manifestly impure.
Axioms Als-A5s provide a pretty good basis for all of classical
mathematics, once we dispense with the idea that there must be special
mathematical objects. We lack only the Axiom of Choice. I shall argue
later that there is reason to adiid.t that axiom as well.
There is also some uncertainty about how the schematic axioms, A3s
and A3s*
,
aire to be understood. I shall argue that they should not be
construed in a purely formal manner. That is, the expression "f" should
not be confined to the expressions of any given formal system.
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with Functions and Relations
Mathematics is concerned with structure generated by the nonelemen-
tary notions of logic. Those notions include not only set membership,
but also forms of predication and forms of functional application. Thus
It seems that a foundation for mathematics should contain laws pertaining
to relations and functions, as well as laws pertaining to sets.
This is true, but the laws required are only a very limited exten-
sion of the laws of sets. Some are quite simple:
Ale VR3xVa^...Va^((a^,..., e x ^ RTa^ , . .
. ,
a^3)
Aac Vf3xya,.,.Va^Va^^,((a, a_^, 6. x f(a, a^) = a^^,)
A3c VxBfiVa .
. .Va (R fa, , . •
. ,
a 3 <— (a a ) ^ x)
A^c Vx3fVa^...Va^Va^^^(f(a^,..., a^) = a^^^ (a^,..., a^, a^^^) £ x)
These rules state correspondences between relations, functions, and sets
of ordered n-tuples. Notice that I have not said that relations and
functions are sets of ordered n-tuples. On the one hand, such identifi-
cation may be impossible. Relations and functions seem to violate exten-
sionality. On the other hand, there is no mathematical need for such
identification.
These correspondences are not quite sufficient to complete the
foundation. It is compatible with Als-A5s and Alc-AifC that a property be
an instance of itself. But I believe that this cannot happen.* Proper-
ties exhibit a regularity comparable to that of sets, which, by A5s,
cannot be members of themselves. This regularity follows from a more
*That it cannot happen is a consequence of most existing type theo-




A5c There is a functional notion itext (the ’’iterated extension notion”)
from objects to objects such that
(i) itext
. (a) = a, if a has no members, maps nothing, and
relates nothing
(ii) itext . (x) = f itext . (b) : b € x}, for any set x
(iii) itext
.
(R) = fC itext . (b^
)






for any n-ary relation R
(iv) itext. (f) = Kitext
.
(b. ) , . . .
,
itext. (b ), itext. (b )) :
1
f(b^,..., b^) = b^_^^], for any n-ary function f
In virtue of A5s, sets come in layers called ranks . In virtue of A5c,
relations and functions also come in layers, via the ranks of their iter-
ated extensions. A layer of relations and functions may be called a
type . Thus the logic of relations and functions proposed here resembles
a cumulative theory of simple types, except that I have dispensed v/ith
the usual restrictions on type theoretic language.
The correspondence rules may enable us to specify infinite sets.
For exaimple, consider the property of being a distance relation . By Ale,
there is a set of all distance relations. But physical science seems to
tell us that there is a continuum of distances which objects may bear to
one another.* Hence the set of all distance relations has the power of
the continuum and so is infinite.
Perhaps this argument for infinite sets is not decisive. Perhaps
there is a less Platonistic interpretation of physical science under
which the argument does not go through. However, the problem of inter-
*Indeed, an infinite part of this continuum is actually exemplified
when one object moves continuously with respect to another.
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preting physical science is much too difficult for any thorough treatment
here. The point relevant to the philosophy of mathematics is that there
can be empirical arguments for the existence of infinite sets.
Notes
Usually sets are divided into ranks by assigning a pure set, an
ordinal, to each. Since I claim there is no special interest in pure
sets, I feel obliged to give the rank construction without appealing to
them. I shall do this by describing the rank-ordering associated with
any transitive set. (A transitive set is one which contains all members
of its members.)
Each rank-ordering is a quasi-well-ordering :
d21 A quasi-well-ordering is a pair of relations (R, E) such that
(i) R and E share the same field
(ii) E is an equivalence relation
(iii) R is transitive
(iv) for any a and b in the field of R, it is not the
case that both RCa, b] and R[b, a]
(v) for any a and b in the field of R, either Rfa, b3
or E[a, b3 or R[b, aj
(vi) for any nonempty subset x of the field of R, there
is a member a of x such that for any member b of x,
either R(a, b] or E[a, bj
For each quasi-well-ordering (R, E)
,
there is an associated well-order-
ing, namely the natural well-ordering of the equivalence classes under E.
d22 A rank-ordering on a transitive set x is a quasi-well-ordering
(R, E) such that
(i) the field of R is x
(ii) for any memberless objects a and b in x, E a, b
(iii) for any object y in x, (a) for any member b of y,
y] > and (b) for any member z of x, if for any
member b of y, R[b, zj , then either R[y, zj or
Efy, z]
(that is, any set y in x is a supreraum of its
elements)
We can prove that wherever rank-orderings intersect, they must agree.
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so are Independent of the transitive background. A set is absolutely of
lesser rank than another if it is so in the rank-ordering of some transi.
tive set.
Abstract isoraorphisas preserve the ranks of iterated extensions:
tl For any abstract isomorphism i, if i(A) = B, then itext.(A) anditext
. (B) are of equal rank.
The proof relies on the inductive character of quasi-well-orderings,
d21(vi): If the theorem fails for an abstract isomorphism i, then, in
the rank-ordering of iterated extensions, there must be a least rank at
which it fails.
One corollary appears in the proof of T3:
t2 If i is an abstract isomorphism from X to Y, then i(X) = i(Y),
and if j is an abstract isomorphism from (X
, . .
. ,
X ) to (Y
..., Y ), then i(X ) = Y ..... i(X ) = Y . ^
“ II n n
The first part follows from tl plus the fact that the iterated extension
of an object X is of greater rank than the iterated extension of any
other object in X*s closure. The second part may be proved analogously.
3. Infinity
Of aill the mathematical axioms in Principia Mathematica
. two have
borne the brunt of criticism, the Axiom of Reducibility and the Axiom of
Infinity. The Axiom of Reducibility states that for any propositional
function which involves quantification over objects of type greater than
or equal to the type of its arguments, there is an equivalent proposi-
tional function v^hich involves no such quantification. In the ramified
type theory of Principia Mathematica . the type of a propositional func-
tion may be determined by the types of variables bound within it. Hence
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the axiom ie a rule for introducing propositional functions of reduced
type. Since the theory of ramified types has fallen out of favor, and
since those theories v/hich are in favor do not require an Axiom of Reduc-
i^ility, criticisms of that axiom are not relevant to our concerns.
The Axiom of Infinity, on the other hand, is worthy of some discus-
sion. That axiom asserts the existence of a propositional function of
infinitely many arguments, or, for our purposes, the existence of an
infinite set.
No one has succeeded in deriving this axiom from any more fundamen-
tal principles. If accepted, it must be accepted either on the basis of
self-evidence or on the basis of some empirical justification.
Is the Axiom of Infinity self-evident? One line of reasoning sug-
gests that it is: The empty set, v/hich has no members, does not depend
for its existence on the existence of anything else. It exists of neces-
sity. Using the general laws of sets, we can prove the existence of sets
founded upon it. For instance, we can prove the existence of [0j,
imii and so on. But surely this sequence of sets can be collected to
form a single set; { 0, |0jf, H0H,---]- necessarily exists
an infinite set.
About the first step, that the empty set exists of necessity, I
shall not quibble. If only that part of the reasoning fails, it would
still show that given the existence of any one thing, there exists an
infinite set.
I object to the collecting step: "But surely this sequence of sets
can be collected to form a single infinite set..." What is the principle
of collection operating here? It cannot be the principle that for every
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way Of specifying things, there is a set consisting of just those things
specified. That principle leads us straight into Russell's Pai'ado;:.
Perhaps the real reasoning is something like this: The existence
of the sets 0, /0], 1 ( 0 }}, and so on is ensured by the set theoretic
axioms. But for any bunch of sets whose existence is ensured by the
axioms, there is a set consisting of all those sets. Hence there is an
infinite set: [ 0 , (0 }, (^0 }},...].
Here the working assumption is that there is a set of all sets whose
existence is ensured by the axioms. That is, there is a set which is a
axioms. The trouble with this assumption is that it is no
easier to accept than the Axiom of Infinity itself.*
In conclusion, I fail to see the self-evidence of the Axiom of
Infinity. Attempts to point it out have amounted to disguised "proofs",
proofs from axioms that are more doubtful.
Against the possibility of empirical justification, Russell himself
argues:** Suppose the only justification of the Axiom of Infinity is
empirical. Such a justification can only show that the Axiom of Infinity
is true, not that it is tautologous
.
or necessary . But every truly math-
ematical proposition must be necessary. Hence an empirical justification
of the Axiom of Infinity does not justify its inclusion among the prin-
*Against this, someone might argue, "The statement that there is a
model for the axioms is equivalent to the statement that the axioms are
consistent. But the statement that the axioms are consistent seems quite
safe indeed. Hence v/e are warranted in asserting the existence of a
model." The trouble with this reasoning is that the theorem asserting
the equivalence of consistency and the existence of models is based on a
certain assumption--the existence of at least one infinite set.
**This argument is implied by remarks in the "Introduction to the




This argument is not wholly persuasive. As Saul Kripke has urged,
the necessity of some propositions can be discovered empirically.* The
Axiom of Infinity is no clear exception. Couldn't we discover that
infinity is in the nature of things? Couldn't we end up with a physical
theory that requires infinitely many objects? (Haven't we? See the
conclusion of the preceding section.)
One might reply that physical science can only tell us what things
are j^sicall^ necessary, that even if the equations of physics require
an infinity of things, it remains metaphysically possible that there be
no infinite sets.
Those who adopt this reply are obliged to explain the distinction
between physical necessity and metaphysical necessity. Moreover, they
must establish that the accepted propositions of mathematics are meta-
physically necessary in the sense explained. These are no mean tasks.
All considered, I think some hope remains that the Axiom of Infinity can
be given an empirical justification.
In view of the flurry caused by the Axiom of Infinity, one might
suppose that it plays an essential role in the foundations of mathematics.
Actually, this is far from clear. Set theory serves tv/o legitimate foun-
dational purposes. It is needed in the specification of the systems of
mathematical theories and in the higher-order development of those theo-
ries. These purposes are fulfilled by axioms of hypothetical existence,
axioms which tell us that if the systems exist, so too do certain sets
*"Identity and Necessity"
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founded on them. Neither purpose requires an axiom categorically asser-
the existence of an infinite set.*
Why then does the Axiom of Infinity appear so frequently in founda-
tional studies? Russell provides one answer:
"In practice, a great deal of mathematics is possible v/ithout
assuming the existence of anything. All the arithmetic of
finite integers and rational fractions can be constructed; but
whatever involves infinite classes of integers becomes impos-
sible. This excludes real numbers and the whole of analysis.
To include them, we need 'the axiom of infinity'..."
Principles of Mathematics
. "Introduction to the Second Edition",
p. viii.
According to Russell, the existence of infinite sets is required in the
development of the theory of real numbers. As Russell conceives it, the
theory of real numbers is about particular objects, real numbers. Since
that theory involves apparent quantifications over infinite sets of real
numbers, it appears to involve commitments to the existence of infinite
sets . **
I have urged that it is wrong to conceive the theory of real numbers
as a theory of particular objects. It is a theory of all real-number-
like systems, or r-systems. Thus a statement which appears to assert the
existence of a certain infinite set of real numbers really asserts the
existence of such a set in every r-system. Such a statement is true even
if the Axiom of Infinity is false, for, in that case, the statement is
vacuously true of all r-systems.
There is one fine point; Higher- order development does not reach
infinite ranks. If it did, infinite sets would be needed even in the
case of finite systems.
Russell himself construes real numbers as infinite sets of ration-
ale. Thus even his quantifications over real numbers involve commitment
to the existence of infinite sets.
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More generally, the Axiom of Infinity has been used to provide
mathematical objects for mathematical theories. If I am right, there are
no mathematical objects, so the axiom is not needed for this purpose.
Can we dispense with the Axiom of Infinity in mathematical reason-
xng? Mathematicians appear to use the axiom in presenting counterexam-
ples to putative theorems. For example, suppose someone asserts, "Every
Boolean algebra is atomic." A mathematician might reply, "No. Consider
an infinite Boolean algebra of the following sort..." If the Axiom of
Infinity is false, then the mathematician has no counterexample, and the
statement stands. But in actual practice, such replies are immediately
devastating, and no one bothers to check whether the Axiom of Infinity is
true.
How are we to make sense of this phenomenon? One explanation has it
that the Axiom of Infinity is accepted by mathematicians as uncontrover-
sially true. Is there a more economical alternative?
According to one alternative, what is devastating to the putative
theorem is not the actual existence of the counterexample described. It
is the recognized possibility of such a counterexample. Perhaps all
Boolean algebras are atomic, but until all the infinite counterexamples
are ruled out, this cannot be accepted as mathematical fact.
I leave open the interpretation of "recognized possibility". It may
well be that nonatomic Boolean algebras are possible in some absolute
metaphysical sense. But certainly they are "epistemically" possible.
Nothing we know rules them out. As long as this remains the case, we
should not believe that all Boolean algebras are atomic.
Since this alternative interpretation seems tenable, the Axiom of
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Infinity does not appear essential to mathematical reasoning.
In summary, we have found no very good reason to include the Axiom
of Infinity in the set theoretical foundations of mathematics. I have
rejected the argument that the Axiom of Infinity is contingent and so not
mathematical. But the Axiom of Infinity is not required to ensure the
existence of mathematical objects, nor is it required to produce infinite
counterexamples. If vie conceive of mathematics as the general study of
abstract structure, then it is fairly easy to see that there is no mathe-
matical need for an absolute assertion of the existence of an infinite
set. *
4. The Classical Conception of Set
Mathematics is commonly viewed as a Platonistic enterprise. But
this view rests partly on the misconception that mathematics is concerned
with special abstract objects, numbers and pure sets. Once this miscon-
ception is cast aside, can vie still judge that mathematics is Platon-
istic?
I have described mathematics as the study of abstract structure.
One might be tempted to say that therefore mathematics is about certain
Platonic entities, abstract structures. However, this conclusion is by
no means forced upon us. The doctrine that mathematics is about abstract
structure can be interpreted to mean that mathematics makes no distinc-
tions between abstractly isomorphic objects, and abstract isomorphism can
*My adoption of a nonabsolutist view on the existence of infinite
sets is due in large part to a study of the considerations advanced in
Michael Jubien's "Formal Semantics and the Existence of Sets".
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be defxned without reference to something, abstract structure, which is
shared (see and D5).» Thus mathematics can be about abstract struc-
ture without there being something, abstract structure, which it is
about
!
Perhaps the systems of mathematical theories are Platonic entities.
Although they are not specially mathematical objects, mathematical theo-
rems apply to them. Maybe this fact makes mathematics Platonistic.
That systems of mathematical theories are Platonic entities should
not be accepted without question. To be sure, I have described these
systems in Platonistic terras: An ^o-sequence is a relation, a group is a
binary function, an r-system is a triple of a unit, a function, and a
relation, and a topology is a property of sets. Yet use of Platonistic
terminology does not guarantee that the things described are the univer-
sals we would normally expect them to be. We have not yet ruled out the
view that sets, relations, and functions are symbolic constructions.
That view is consistent with the formal set theory consisting of Als-A5s
and Alc-A5c.
What debars us from regarding sets, relations, and functions as
symbolic constructions, and. v;hat indeed makes modern mathematics Platon-
istic, is the fact that the standard, classical conception of set is far
richer than the formal theory. Although we can imagine models for the
formal theory in which sets, relations, and functions are symbolic con-
structions, these models are very unlike the classical realm of sets,
*If there were universals, abstract structures, which abstractly
isomorphic objects share, they would outstrip the ranks of set theory,
the types of type theory. Abstract isomorphisms, on the other hand,
have been defined as functions in the ordinary sense.
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relations, and functions.
The richness of the classical conception stems in part from an
informal extension of the Separation Schema:




this tells us that for any set x, and any formula f
of formal set theory, there is a subset of x consisting of just those
members of x which satisfy ?. According to the classical conception, the
Separation Schema can be extended so that it covers subsets snecifiable
in ordinary language or in scientific language: For any set x, and any
meaningful formula 9, there is a subset of x consisting of just those
members of x which satisfy 9.
This extension is not part of the formal theory, since it involves
quantification over expressions outside the formalism. Nevertheless, it
meets with nearly universal acceptance. Without it, set theory could not
be linked with practical applications in a fully satisfactory way. We
v/ould have trouble dealing with, for example, sets of symbols or sets of
fundamental particles.
Although natural language is certainly less limited than formal set
theory, it is still not rich enough to yield the classical conception.
Even the extended Separation Schema does not tell us precisely what the
subsets of any given set are. Because every language is limited in some
respect, there might be subsets that have no linguistic specification.
Thus there is more to be said about the classical conception.
The classical conception is an absolute conception.* Language can
*My use of "absolute" should not be confused with any existing tech-
nical uses.
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change with time. It can increase in expressive power. But the subsets
of a set are fixed for all time:
P5 For any set x and times t and t'
,
the power set of x at t is
identical to the power set of x at t'.
Indeed, we might say that subsets are fixed across all possible worlds:
P5' For any set x and worlds w and w'
,
the power set of x in w is
identical to the power set of x in w'.
These principles sever any essential connection between sets and symbolic
constructions. They are expressions of the Platonistic character of the
classical conception.
The classical conception is a maximally rich conception. Indeed,
from Pp and Extended Separation, we can shov/ that no matter hov; language
increases in expressive power, we shall never be able to specify a sub-
collection of a set which is not one of its classical subsets. And that
is not the whole of maximal richness: The subsets of a set are as many
as they could conceivably be
,
given the Axiom of Extensionality .
*
The significance of tiriis can be illuminated v^ith an example. Sup-
pose we are given an infinite set x of two-member ed sets. Suppose each
member of x consists of a pair of empirically indistinguishable objects.
** Is there a set consisting of exactly one member from each member
of X? It seems that a maximally rich conception must admit the exis-
tence of many such sets, for there is nothing to rule them out. (Notice
that each such set is simply a subcollection of the union of x.) let
*In "Mathematics Without Foundations", Hilary Putnam gives a novel
account of maximal richness, one framed in terms of the possibility of
concrete arrov/ diagrams.





these sets involve infinitely many arbitrary "choices", and so cannot be
specified in any human language. Thus the classical conception seems to
admit subsets that could not be specified in any language whatsoever!
The specific point of this example is that the classical conception
supports the Axiom of Choice: For any set x of nonempty sets, there
exists a choice set c consisting of exactly one member from each member
of X. *
Extended Separation, Absoluteness, and the Axiom of Choice are
helpful clarifications of the classical conception. Do they single it
out uniquely? If Absoluteness is taken in form P5, but not in form P5'
,
then the classical conception is probably not singled out. If it is
taken in form P5' as well, then whether we have succeeded in isolating
the classical view depends on how strong the notions of possible world
(P5') and language (Extended Separation) are. They might well be strong
enough to tell us how sets are arranged in a classical universe.
In any event, these principles distinguish the classical conception
from all constructive conceptions. Since the classical view underlies
mathematics, mathematics is thereby Platonistic— not of course in the
sense that it requires special Platonic objects, but in the sense that it
postulates a nonconstructive realm of subsets for any given set.**
*This seems to follow from P5'
•
For example, although Russell's
socks are indistinguishable in this v/orld, there is a possible world in
which exactly one member of each pair has a hole. In that world, the
extended version of Separation gives us a choice set, the socks with
holes. P5' tells us that the choice set exists in this world as well!
**Notice that the divergence between the classical and constructive
conceptions appears only in the case of infinite sets.
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Notes
One nick in the armor of Platonism is the fact that so little of the
classical conception can actually be manifested in practice. Extended
Separation is certainly useful in applications. Absoluteness, on the
other hand, is of little practical value. About all that can be said in
its favor is that its strong form, P5'
,
does support the mathematically
useful Axiom of Choice.
V/hether a coherent view can be constructed which accepts Extended
Separation but rejects Absoluteness and the Axiom of Choice remains an
open question.
5. Attacks on the Classical Conception
In recent years, some philosophers have attacked the classical
conception on the ground that it is hopelessly "unclear". In "The Thesis
that Mathematics is Logic", Hilary Putnam adopts this position and gives
several considerations in support of it.
Suppose we are given a countably infinite set S. Then the classical
conception is supposed to give us a definite understanding of what the
subsets of S are. Putnam denies that we can acquire such an understand-
ing. He points out that there are uncountably many subsets of S. Hence
in any human language, most of these sets are indefinable. Assuming that
we have an understanding of definable sets, Putnam does not see how we
can ascend to an understanding of sets definable or not. Thus he be-
lieves that the general notion of a set remains unclear.
According to the classical conception, every set theoretic question
has an ansv/er in the realm of all sets. In particular, the Continuum
no
Hypothesis has a definite truth-value. Putnam points out that the Con-
tinuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of each of the usual for-
mal set theories. He says further that both it and its negation are
compatible with reasonable extensions of the (unclear) classical notion
of set. So Putnam concludes that the classical conception is not clear
enough to endow the Continuum Hypothesis with a definite truth-value.
In an attempt to remedy the deficiencies of the classical concep-
tion, Putnam suggests a "postulational" approach to set theory. He seems
to be reasoning as follows: The classical notion of set is unclear.
Various clarifications are possible—we need only add to the postulates
sets are supposed to satisfy. But there is no one proper clarification.
Therefore, mathematics does not aim to discover truths concerning a def-
inite realm of things, sets. It draws the consequences of various sys-
tems of postulates, v/hether those are postulates concerning sets or not.
That is, mathematics does not investigate hypotheses of the form 'H(6.)‘,
where '•£" is the symbol for set membership. Instead, it concerns itself




where A is a conjunc-
tion of postulates, and R is a variable over all notions whatsoever.
Putnam's suggestion certainly clashes v/ith mathematical practice.
In the pursuit of mathematical theories, a set theoretic background is
always presupposed, not postulated. Moreover, the background is the same
from theory to theory, at least there is no detectable difference. And
this common set theoretic background does not deviate from the classical
conception.
Taken as a prescription for future mathematical practice, Putnam s
suggestion does not seem to be a very good idea. We can indeed study
the
consequences of different fogaj set theories. But Putnam would have us
study alternatives to the classical conception of set. Since that con-
!
^
ception and its competitors are not purely formal, it is difficult to see
I
how this would be done. We could not merely examine various axiomatic
j
systems.
Nor does Putnam's "undecidability" argument seem strong enough to
warrant the change in practice. Putnam says that the models used to show
the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis represent reasonable exten-
j
sions of the standard conception of set. This seems false. It is highly
' unnatural to think that sets are limited to Godel's "constructable" sets.
I
* i!*ven less natural are the models in which the Continuum Hypothesis has
been proved false. No one has really shown that there are ways of fill-
ing out the standard conception which yield different truth-values for
the Continuum Hypothesis. The independence proof pertains to formal set
I theory, but the standard conception is not formal,
j
Of course, "informality" is not a magic v;ord which decides all
I
i
questions. No one working within the classical conception is quite sure
I
j
what the truth-value of the Continuum Hypothesis is. Some feel that it
]
is false, but even they are not willing to guess what the power of the
continuum really is.*'^ Does this show that the classical conception is
unclear?
j
From the fact that we are uncertain of the truth-value of the Con-
tinuum Hypothesis it does not follow that the Continuum Hypothesis lacks
*As noted by Paul Cohen, Set Theor.y and the Continuum Hypothesis ,
p. 150- 1 .
**See Kurt Godel's article, "What is Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis?",





a truth-value. Hence we have not discovered serious unclarity of the
sort Putnam has in mind.
The second problem Putnam raises is based on the observation that
not all subsets of a countable infinite set are definable. Thus even if
we have an understanding of definable sets, we need not have a clear
notion of sets definable or not. Here too a reply is possible. V/hen it
is said that not all subsets of a countably infinite set are definable,
it is meant that there can be no one human language in which each is
defined. It is not meant that there is a subset which is not definable
in any possible human language. To make this clearer, suppose we are
aware (somehow) of the existence of an
-i>-sequence. We might, at least in
principle, construct a machine generating an infinite random sequence of
"l"'s and "0"'s. If we do so, then we can define a predicate 9 which is
satisfied by the n-th member of the <b-sequence if and only if the ma-
chine's n-th output is a "1". The extension of this predicate is a sub-
set of the 6)-sequence. But it could be any subset of the cj-sequence,
depending on 'what happens. So there is no subset of the sequence which
is indefinable in principle. This suggests, contrary to Putnam, that we
do have a clear notion of the subsets of an infinite sequence. Although
some subsets must remain undefined, none are indefinable in principle.
Thus the gap between the understanding of defined and undefined subsets
(none are really indefinable) is not so great as Putnam indicates.
Perhaps an even better course is to reject Putnam's complaint alto-
gether. V/hy should our inability to specify all the subsets of a given
set entail a deficiency in our understanding of what the subsets of that
set are? Surely it is possible to understand a kind of thing without
113
being able to specify all the individuals of the kind. Putnam's reason-
ing makes sense only if sots are things »hich must admit of specifica-
tion. But to assume that sets must admit of specification is to opt in
favor of a constructive viewpoint, and to beg the question against the
classical conception.
Where Putnam points out difficulties tor the classical conception,
I see little problem at all. Is there no plausibility in the idea that
the classical conception is unclear?
The feeling that the classical conception is unclear probably arises
from the fact that this conception is not formalizable. In particular,
the formal Separation Schema does not quite yield the classical notion of
a subset. However, our inability to express the classical conception
using formal devices does not necessarily signify any deficiency in that
conception.
The Incompleteness Theorem shows that even elementary arithmetic is
not formalizable. Yet not even the Intuitionists would maintain that
arithmetic is "unclear".
Moreover, the classical conception can be "filled out" informally by
saying that it is a maximally rich conception, that the subsets of a set
are as many as they possibly could be, given Extensionality
.
This infor-
mal elaboration may not satisfy formal philosophers, but they have not
yet found any serious v/eakness in it.
In "Mathematics Without Foundations", Putnam himself gives a novel
expression of the informal content of the classical conception, and he
abandons the position I have criticised here.
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Notes
The precise result concernins the continuum is this: Assumins the
existence of a standard model for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory if it
r > 1, IS any cardinal in the niniraal model M, then there is an extension
of M in which either (l) there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
power set of cj and H^(where does not have cofinality w)
,
or (2)
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the power set of co and
^T + 1 does have cofinality co).*
This result has suggested to some that there is no such thing as
maximal richness”
,
that there is an unending chain of increasingly rich
models (or possible models) of set theory, and, in particular, that there
is no model in which the continuum is maximally rich, in which o has all
the subsets it possibly could have.
I myself am not inclined to draw this conclusion. Cohen's specific
result concerns only cardinals of the minimal model . None of these
cardinals is absolutely uncountable. Thus, for example, the result does
not assure us of the possibility of a model in v/hich P((o) = where
is real second uncountable cardinal.
In all fairness, I should say that the insolubility of the continuum
problem has had no great practical effect on contemporary mathematics.
The Continuum Hypothesis itself, P(6)) =
,
has some odd results, but
it does not overturn any classical theorems.** Probably other hypotheses
concerning the cardinality of the continuum are equally harmless. Thus
*Frora Cohen's Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis , p. 95-6, 129,
134.




there is no pressing need to decide which hypothesis is right.
Maybe some day the continuum problem will be regarded as an avoid-
able one. However, in the context of present-day foundations, it natu-
rally occurs to us.*
6. What are Sets?: An Identity Theory
The arrangement of the set theoretic universe is not nearly so
problematic as the nature of its elements. Sets are commonly described
as "collections", but this view is fraught with difficulties. Tv/o of
these difficulties are noted by Russell in Introduction to Mathematical
Philosophy ; If sets are collections, it is hard to see why there is an





Moreover, the notion of a collection is not antecedently clear. The
notion is fairly manageable if we mean by collection a number of things
gathered together in one place. But obviously there are sets which are
not collections in this sense.
Of course, one might adopt the view that sets are theoretical enti-
ties of a unique and fundeunental sort. Because they are theoretical
entities, they cannot be described in fully ordinary terras. Because they
are unique and fundamental, they cannot be described in independent tech-
nical terms. Nevertheless, they are not much more suspicious than other
theoretical entities. Although we do not observe them directly, they do
play a certain role in scientific and mathematical theory.
*I am indebted to Michael Jubien for raising the issues contained in
these Notes.
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Against such views, Russell argues that sets cannot be part of the
"ultimate furniture" of the universe:
"If we had a complete symbolic language, with a definition for
everything definable, and an undefined symbol for every tiling
indefinable, the undefined symbols in this language would repre-
sent what I mean by 'the ultimate furniture of the world.' I
am maintaining that no symbols either for 'class' in general or
for particular classes would be included in this apparatus of
undefined symbols." IMP
,
ch. XVII, p. l82
Russell goes on to describe a clever procedure for eliminating talk of
sets in favor of talk ofproperties.* **
Unfortunately, Russell's description of a proper ontology is seri-
ously incomplete. For what does he mean by "definition"? If by a defi-
nition he means a rule for replacing one symbol with another which is
necessarily equivalent to it, then it does seem that he has "defined
away" sets. But under this sense of definition, there are no absolute
indefinables . What is undefined in one complete symbolic language is
defined in another. For example, one complete symbolic language might
contain a symbol for each precise distance relation, x is r units from y .
Another might contain no primitive syiabols for these relations, but only
for relations of the form x is less than r units from y . Thus a strict
application of Russell's views leaves us with unpalatable alternatives.
Either we conclude that the "ultimate furniture" is language-relative, or
we conclude that the world has no "ultimate furniture" whatsoever.
*V/here Russell says "class", we may read "set", since Russell does
not include proper classes in the extension of his terra. Russell's theo-
ry of classes is not quite like modern set theory--it is "stratified" by
underlying type distinctions—but the difference is immaterial here.
**I use the term "property" in place of Russell's "propositional func-
tion of one variable". The difference in meaning is negligible, except
where Russell describes propositional functions as "symbols". The elimi-
nation of sets cannot be accomplished via symbols (see section 4)-
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On the other hand, suppose by "definition" he means analysis
. Then
he must do more than present a scheme for replacing talk of sets. He
must argue that the replacing terms are more basic than the terms re-
placed. He must argue that properties are more "respectable" than sets.
It does appear that property-terms are essential to any complete
symbolic language. We could not get along with merely the corresponding
sets. For example, suppose x is a set which is the extension of distinct
properties F and Q. Then attributions of membership in x are no replace-
ment for both attributions of P and attributions of Q.
Yet it does not follow that terms for ^ imaginable properties are
essential to a complete symbolic language. In particular, it does not
follow that all the properties needed in the elimination of sets are
needed in such a language.
Russell himself provides a glaring example. Consider the choice set
which picks out one sock from each of infinitely many pairs, the choice
set mentioned in Russell's discussion of the Axiom of Choice (MP, p.
125-7; also, section of this chapter). This choice set involves in-
finitely many arbitrary selections, selections between indistinguishable
objects. So too does any corresponding property. But intuitively no
such property belongs to the "ultimate furniture" of the universe.
It is difficult to state this intuition precisely. By hypothesis,
such a property belongs to a thing only if it does not belong to some
qualitatively identical thing. Thus attributions of such a property do
nothing to describe the qualities of objects. Naturally v;e might con-
clude that such attributions are inessential to complete symbolic lan-
guages. Thus the properties needed to eliminate the choice sets are no
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more respectable than the sets themselves!
I conclude that Russell has not succeeded in analyzing sets away.
And we might have expected this from the beginning. For each set,
Russell postulates an equivalent property. Thus little reduction in
complexity is possible, and no reduction in number.
Having given up the idea of ancdyzing sets away, let us return to an
idea that Russell rejected, that sets are identical with certain proper-
ties. An identity theory affords no genuine ontological gain, but it
does allow us to simplify our notation. The notation for membership is
adsorbed by the notation for simple predication. Of course, Russell's
logical construction theory also simplifies notation, but the notation
which replaces membership is far more cumbersome than it would be under
an identity theory.
Russell says that for every set, there are many properties v/hich are
exemplified by just the members of that set. Russell rejects identity
theories because he sees no reason why one property should be the set,
and the other equivalent properties not. If we possessed a general means
for singling one property out of each class of equivalent properties,
then perhaps Russell's objection would be answered.
A finite set x can be specified by an enumeration of its elements:
To this way of specifying the set, there corresponds a
unique property, the property expressed by the open formula: a = a^ V
a = a v...Va = a. Such properties may be called enumerative prop)-
-n
ertles . The view I shall propose is that sets these enumerative
properties.
The foremost objection to this view is that infinite sets cannot be
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enumerative properties, since there can be no enumerating formulae in the
case of infinite sets. I shall answer this objection by giving an ac-
count of enumerative properties that makes no reference to formulae.
Thus the absence of formulae for infinite sets is no bar to the existence
of the enumerative properties.
I understand that properties are identical if it is necessarily true
that they are exemplified by the same things.* Thus to specify a prop-
erty, it is sufficient to say what its instances are in every possible
world.
Consider the enumerative property corresponding to the set fa, b].
It is the property of being identical to a or identical to b. In any
possible world in which this property exists, it has exactly the in-
stances a and b. That is, it has its instances essentially.
In general, an enumerative property is a property such that anything
which could be an instance of it is essentially an instance of it. Obvi-
ously such a property might be exemplified by infinitely many things.
A detail remains. Given a set of objects, there might be more than
one property such that (l) every one of its possible instances falls in
that set, and (2) every one of its possible instances is essentially an
instance of it. This is so because two such properties might not exist
in the very same worlds. Hence an existence condition must be added if
we are to be assured of a unique correspondence between enumerative
properties and sets.
*I do not maintain that predicates which express the same property
have the very same "meaning". In order to have the very same meaning,





The condition to require is that an enunerative property exists
wherever all its possible instances exist and are "collectable". The
instances are collectable in a possible world just in case there is some
property which they share in that world:
D13 P is an enuraerative property =df P is a property such that
(1) if for some possible world w and possible object a, a has
P in w, then for any possible world w' in which P exists, a has
P in w', and (2) P exists in every world w such that all pos-
sible objects which have P in some world both exist in w and
share some property Q in v/
This definition paves the way for an identity theory:
P6 Sets are enumerative properties. An object is a member of a
set just in case it is an instance of it.
The reader should convince himself that enumerative properties satisfy
extensionality
.
According to this theory, there is an empty set, namely the impos-
sible property, the property of being non-self-identical. Also, a one
membered set is distinct from its sole member, since an object a is dis-
tinct from the enumerative property of being identical to a.
Why do Russell and others believe that every set has at least one
defining property? My explanation is that they take for granted the
existence of "merely" enumerative properties. Thus a property exists
even for those sets which are not distinguished by any truly general
feature. But given the existence of these enumerative properties, there
is no reason not to adopt the identity theory.
Notes
The ideas presented in this section can also yield a theory of
relations-in- extension and functions-in- extension . For example, the
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relation expressed by the open formula "a = a & b = b" might be that
relation-in~extension which relates Just the pair (a, b)
. This theory of
extensional items has fewer arbitrary features than standard set theo-
retic reductions to sets of ordered n-tuples. Recall that we do need
sucn extensional items. For example, if a group is to have a proper
number of subgroups, then subgroups must be functions-in-extension. We
noted this fact in ch. II, s. 1.)
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